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SHARPENING THE BLUNT BLUE PENCIL:
RENEWING THE REASONS FOR COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE IN NORTH CAROLINA*
JON P. MCCLANAHAN** & KIMBERLY

M. BURKE**

Covenants not to compete are often included in modern
employment contracts to prevent employees from working for
competitors for a specified amount of time after termination of
employment. Although such covenants were initially
unenforceable at common law because they represented invalid
restraints on trade, most jurisdictions today enforce covenants
not to compete where such covenants are reasonable.
Jurisdictions differ, however, in their treatment of unreasonable
covenants, choosing from one of three approaches: the all-ornothing approach, which prohibits a court from striking out or
modifying any part of a covenant; the "strict blue pencil
doctrine," which allows a court to strike out an unreasonable
provision if separableand enforce the remainderof the covenant
as written; or judicial modification, which grants a court greater
flexibility to strike out or modify an unreasonableprovision to
allow partialenforcement of a covenant.
Courts, rather than legislatures, have usually developed the
framework for evaluating covenants not to compete and
determined each state's approachto unreasonablecovenants. For
example, North Carolina'sframework for evaluating covenants,
which focuses on the time, territorialbreadth, and scope of the
restriction, was developed over eighty years ago and remains
largely intact today, despite the significant changes in how
companies structure their businesses and leverage their
employees' skills. At the same time, North Carolina courts
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continue to adhere to the state's version of the strict blue pencil
doctrinefirst adopted in 1961.
This Article examines the current state of covenants not to
compete in North Carolina. Because of the jurisdiction's
adherence to an outdated reasonableness framework and
continued reliance on the strict blue pencil doctrine, North
Carolinacourts are faced with the task of evaluating twenty-first
century covenants using twentieth century tools-leading to
contradictory case law and strained reasoning. This Article
concludes that North Carolinacourts need a different equitable
tool in order to truly ensure that covenants not to compete fairly
balance the interests of employees and employers, and it suggests
several judicial and legislative reforms that would create a
consistent, yet flexible, framework for evaluating and enforcing
non-compete agreements.
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INTRODUCTION

Covenants not to compete, also known as non-compete
agreements, are commonly included in employment contracts to
prevent employees from working for competitors for a specified
amount of time after termination of employment.1 Yet the acceptance
of covenants not to compete in contract law is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Initially at common law, such covenants were
disallowed because they represented invalid restraints on trade.2
Courts were wary that restrictive covenants would negatively impact
competition, encourage monopolies, and drive up prices.' Eventually,
however, the common law evolved to allow for enforcement of
certain reasonable covenants not to compete.4 This reasonableness
approach recognized the complex and competing interests of
employers, employees, and society: the interest of employers in
1. The term "restrictive covenants" is more expansive than "covenants not to
compete"; such covenants can be found in different kind of contracts, including contracts
to sell a business, franchise contracts, and employment contracts. Reference to "restrictive
covenants" in this Article is intended to describe non-compete agreements solely in the
context of employment contracts.
2. Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Comment, Let's Be Reasonable: Rethinking the
ProhibitionAgainst Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in
North Carolina,82 N.C. L. REV. 249, 250 (2003).
3. Id. at 253.
4. Id. at 254-55.
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prohibiting former employees from misappropriating business assets,
the interest of employees in occupational mobility, and the interest of
the public in fostering an efficient and innovative marketplace. 5 In
light of these conflicting interests, the reasonableness approach
theoretically "allows employee non-compete agreements but imposes
significant limits on restrictive covenants to assure that they are not
overly burdensome to employees and harmful to the marketplace." 6
Although some state legislatures have provided statutory
guidance on non-compete agreements, in most states the legality and
interpretation of non-compete agreements remains governed by
common law. Today, nearly all states are willing to enforce noncompete agreements so long as the restrictions are reasonably
tailored and are not general restraints on competition.7 While there
are no uniform standards for what constitutes a "reasonable"
covenant not to compete,8 most courts, including those in North
Carolina,9 weigh the time, territorial breadth, and scope of
employment restricted by the covenant. 10 Notably, North Carolina's
reasonableness analysis remains largely the same today as it was over
eighty years ago-before mass long-distance transit, telecommuting,

5. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. Bus.
L.J. 107,115 (2008).
6. Id.
7. See Robert J. Orelup & Christopher S. Drewry, Judicial Review and Reformation
of Noncompete Agreements, CONSTRUCrION LAW, Summer 2009, at 29, 33-44 (providing
a fifty-state survey of judicial and legislative approaches toward covenants not to
compete). California and North Dakota are two states that consider restrictive covenants
generally void. Id. at 33, 40. Some states that allow restrictive covenants have set formal
requirements, such as requiring covenants to be in writing or to be accompanied by
consideration. See infra note 28. This Article will not address formality requirements but
instead will focus on decisions to enforce covenants on account of the reasonableness of
the provisions.
8. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 625, 646-81 (1960) (discussing different approaches used by courts throughout the
country). Some states now have statutory guidelines for enforcing covenants not to
compete. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.774a(1) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.465 (West 2012).
9. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C.
223, 148 S.E. 315 (1929), the first North Carolina case to articulate the reasonableness
standard in the employment agreement context).
10. See Orelup & Drewry, supra note 7, at 29-30 (noting that despite "state-specific
variations," most courts consider the "duration," "geographic scope," and "type of
activity" prohibited by a non-compete agreement when determining reasonableness). This
Article refers to activity restrictions-the types of activities the employee is prohibited
from engaging in with another company-as the "scope" of the non-compete agreement.
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and the Internet fundamentally altered the ways companies structure
their business and leverage their employees. 1"
While most states recognize the validity of reasonable covenants
not to compete, they vary considerably in their enforcement of
partially unreasonable covenants, choosing from one of three
approaches: the all-or-nothing approach, the "strict blue pencil
doctrine," or judicial modification. 2 Under the all-or-nothing
approach, a court may not strike out or modify an unreasonable
portion of a covenant not to compete; the covenant is either enforced
in its entirety or is given no effect.13 By the middle of the twentieth
century, most jurisdictions followed the "strict blue pencil doctrine,"
which allows a court to strike out an unreasonable provision, if
14
separable, and enforce the remainder of a covenant as written.
Under this doctrine, a court has no power to strike out an
unreasonable portion of the covenant if it is not separable, and a
court cannot otherwise modify the language of the covenant. 5
Judicial modification, sometimes referred to as the "liberal blue
pencil doctrine," developed in response to the rigidity of the other
approaches; 16 it gives a court greater authority to strike out or modify
an unreasonable portion of a covenant, irrespective of whether it is
separable from the remainder of the covenant. 7
Although North Carolina courts initially adopted the all-ornothing approach, 8 they soon settled on a version of the strict blue
pencil doctrine, which gives courts very limited authority to enforce
11. See MJM Investigations, Inc., v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at
*5 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010) (Steelman, J., concurring) (urging the Supreme Court of
North Carolina to reexamine non-compete jurisprudence in light of the "increasingly
integrated global economy").
12. Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:
Judicial & Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 245 (2007) ("There are three basic approaches
jurisdictions use in response to an unreasonable term: voiding the agreement, using the
'Blue Pencil' doctrine to eliminate an unreasonable term, and using the 'Blue Pencil'
doctrine to eliminate an unreasonable term and replace it with a reasonable term.").
13. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 682 (2008).
14. See id. at 681 ("The 'blue-pencil test' is a 'judicial standard for deciding whether to
invalidate the whole contract or only the offending words.'" (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004))).
15. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 118.
16. Id. at 130.
17. Swift, supranote 12, at 249-50.
18. See, e.g., Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 245, 45 S.E.2d 121, 123 (1947)
(announcing that North Carolina courts must determine the enforceability of covenants in
their entirety).
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any restrictions within a covenant.19 Over time, as the framework for

evaluating covenants not to compete no longer fit modern business
operations, the limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine left the
courts in an increasingly untenable position. Because a court had no
power to modify the language of a covenant not to compete, the
enforceability of a particular covenant-and thus, whether the
employee at issue would be free to work for any competitor-turned

on how the court fit the covenant's language into this outdated
framework. The result, as this Article shows, is a record of
unpredictable results and seemingly contradictory outcomes.20

Covenants not to compete have generated a fair amount of
attention in legal scholarship;2' recently, some have questioned the
role of such covenants, given the current employment environment. 2
Legislatures in several states have joined the conversation over the
proper role of non-compete agreements for constituent employers
and employees.2 3 Despite the nationwide dialogue on the continued

vitality of covenants not to compete, the judicial and legislative
branches in North Carolina have remained silent. In fact, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has not squarely ruled on the
enforceability of covenants not to compete since 1990.24 Recognizing
the dearth of recent supreme court guidance, Judge Sanford L.
19. See, e.g., Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 248, 120 S.E.2d 739,
742 (1961) ("The court is without power to vary or reform the contract by reducing either
the territory or the time covered by the restrictions."); Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs.,
117 N.C. App. 307, 317, 450 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1994) (noting that a court does not have the
authority to rewrite a covenant).
20. See infra Part II.B-C; cf. Swift, supra note 12, at 244 ("Employment relationships
and the products and services sold and provided are too varied for fixed terms to operate
equitably.").
21. For a helpful resource discussing each state's approach to covenants not to
compete and a list of legal scholarship relevant to each state's jurisprudence, see generally
BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
(Stacy A. Campbell et al. eds., 7th ed. 2010).
22. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not To Compete in a Knowledge
Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for
Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 291 (2006) (discussing
the role of covenants not to compete in the wake of the shift from a manufacturing
economy to a service economy).
23. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2701-2704 (Supp. 2011) (providing
comprehensive statutory guidance); see also Justin A. Steiner, Efficient and Effective NonCompete Agreements in a Down Economy, 53 ADVOCATE 26 (2010) (discussing effects of
the new statutory provisions in Idaho); infra Part IV (discussing legislative approaches to
non-compete analysis).
24. Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 327 N.C. 224, 227, 393 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1990)
(finding non-compete agreement reasonable in terms of time and territory and hence
enforceable).
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Steelman, Jr. wrote a concurrence in a 2010 North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision calling for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to
covenants . . .in the context of
reevaluate "the law of restrictive
25
changing economic conditions.
This Article echoes Judge Steelman's call to examine the current
state of North Carolina law regarding covenants not to compete.
Specifically, the Article analyzes the difficulties in evaluating modern
covenants under the established reasonableness framework, as well as
the limitations of North Carolina's "strict blue pencil doctrine" in
producing consistent, equitable results. Ultimately, this Article
concludes that North Carolina courts need a different tool in order to
truly ensure that non-compete agreements fairly balance the interests
of employees and employers, and it suggests that the courts should
adopt the judicial modification approach used by the majority of
United States jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Article posits that the
North Carolina legislature should clarify the state's position on
covenants not to compete, expressly authorize judicial modification,
and provide additional guidance for courts to use in evaluating a
covenant's reasonableness.
Part I provides a brief introduction to case law and trends
regarding covenants not to compete in North Carolina. This Part
identifies the tests that courts have traditionally used to determine a
covenant's reasonableness-tests that focused on the time, territorial
breadth, and scope of employment restricted by a covenant-and
explains why courts have increasingly struggled to apply those tests to
modem covenants. Part II explores the "strict blue pencil doctrine."
This Part discusses the initial adoption of the doctrine by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, examines the limited application
of the doctrine in non-compete jurisprudence, and highlights the
limitations of the doctrine in providing a predictable and equitable
remedy for unreasonable covenants. Part III further addresses the
advantages and limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine as well as
two alternative judicial approaches toward unreasonable covenants:
the all-or-nothing approach and the judicial modification approach.
This Part concludes that North Carolina courts should adopt a variant
of the judicial modification approach as a more precise and
predictable equitable tool to partially enforce covenants to which the
parties agreed. Part IV discusses how the North Carolina legislature
could bring further clarity to the enforcement of covenants not to
25. MJM Investigations, Inc., v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *5
concurring).
(N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010) (Steelman, J.,
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compete in the state. This Part examines legislation from other states,
focusing on statutory provisions that identify the state's position on
the enforcement of covenants not to compete and guide courts in
assessing the reasonableness of restrictions. Ultimately, the Article
concludes that both judicial and legislative actions are needed in
North Carolina to ensure that covenants not to compete
appropriately balance the interests of employers, employees, and the
general public.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE IN NORTH CAROLINA

In the 1929 decision of Scott v. Gillis,26 the Supreme Court of

North Carolina first recognized the enforceability of non-compete
provisions in an employment agreement:
If the restrictions are not otherwise contrary to public policy,
they must be held to be valid when they appear to be
reasonably necessary for the fair protection of the employer's
business or rights, and do not unreasonably restrict the rights of
the employee, due regard being had to the subject-matter of the

contract, and the circumstances and conditions under which it is
to be performed.2 7

Although the enforceability of a non-compete agreement in
North Carolina is subject to several limitations, 8 the most prominent
limitation is that the agreement be "reasonable" in various respectsincluding the time, territorial breadth, and scope of the restriction.2 9
26. 197 N.C. 223,148 S.E. 315 (1929).
27. Id. at 227, 148 S.E. at 317 (emphasis added) (quoting 6 WILLIAM M. MCKINNEY
& BURDETT A. RICH, RULING CASE LAW § 206, at 805-06). Prior to the Scott decision,
North Carolina courts had enforced restrictive covenants in the context of business
acquisitions. See id.
28. Orkin Exterminating Co. of Raleigh v. Griffin, 258 N.C. 179, 181, 128 S.E.2d 139,
140-41 (1962) (stating that North Carolina courts will "enforce a covenant not to compete
if it is: '(1) in writing, (2) entered into at the time and as a part of the contract of
employment, (3) based on valuable considerations, (4) reasonable both as to time and
territory embraced in the restrictions, (5) fair to the parties, and (6) not against public
policy.'" (quoting Asheville Assocs. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 402, 121 S.E.2d 593, 594
(1961))).
29. See, e.g., Med. Staffing Network v. Ridgway, 194 N.C. App. 649, 656, 670 S.E.2d
321, 327 (2009) ("To be valid, the restrictions 'must be no wider in scope than is necessary
to protect the business of the employer.'" (quoting Manpower v. Hedgecock, 42 N.C.
App. 515, 521, 257 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1979))); Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App.
85, 86, 638 S.E.2d 617, 618 (2007) ("When considering the enforceability of a covenant not
to compete, a court examines the reasonableness of its time and geographic restrictions,
balancing the substantial right of the employee to work with that of the employer to
protect its legitimate business interests.").
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At the time when North Carolina courts were first developing tests
for judging the reasonableness of non-compete agreements, business
operations were vastly different than they are today;30 most
companies had a limited geographic footprint, and they used noncompete agreements to restrict their employees, often salespersons,
from taking positions with direct competitors in the immediate
locale.31 Despite the vast changes in how companies leverage their
businesses, the tests used for evaluating non-compete agreements
remain largely the same today.32 Not surprisingly, this disconnect has
led to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions 33as courts try to apply
these older tests to modern business operations.
This Part identifies several aspects of the state's non-compete
jurisprudence and tracks their development. First, this Part examines
the importance of time and territory in early decisions and their
subsequent decline. Although there has been a recent shift toward
allowing broader territorial restrictions, courts continue to struggle to
evaluate non-compete agreements that do not fit the traditional
model. Second, this Part identifies the increased scrutiny given to the
scope of activities prohibited by a restrictive covenant.34 Even though
scope has become an integral part of the reasonableness framework,
courts have not consistently applied the rules for assessing its impact.
Third, this Part discusses how an employee's position within a
company affects the evaluation of a covenant's reasonableness.
Although there is a recent trend of enforcing covenants against
senior-level employees, the level of the employee has not been fully
captured in the tests espoused by courts.

30. Cf Louis Uchitelle, Small Companies Going Global, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at
D1 (discussing the dramatic increase in the globalization of small businesses in the United
States during the previous decade).
31. See, e.g., Clyde Rudd & Assocs. v. Taylor, 29 N.C. App. 679, 684, 225 S.E.2d 602,
605 (1976) (evaluating restrictive covenant between employer and sales representative
assigned to ten-county region).
32. For a discussion of recent changes to the business environment and the impact of
these changes on the effectiveness of covenants not to compete, see generally Chiara F.
Orsini, Comment, Protecting an Employer's Human Capital: Covenants Not to Compete
and the ChangingBusiness Environment, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175 (2000).
33. See infra Part I.A-C.
34. Interestingly, the increased scrutiny on the scope of a restriction evolved at the
same time as courts' willingness to allow broader territorial restrictions.
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Time and Territory as Key to Reasonableness in Early Decisions

North Carolina courts require covenants not to compete to be
reasonable in time and territory,3 5 and early state jurisprudence
largely upheld covenants not to compete. 6 These early cases
established that time restraints would not be closely scrutinized,37 and
restrictions up to five years were generally considered reasonable.3"
Since then, decisions have reaffirmed five years as the "outer
boundary" of reasonableness,3 9 while simultaneously noting that "five
year restrictions are not favored."4 On the other end of the spectrum,
restrictions of six months and one year have been almost uniformly
upheld, 4' regardless of whether there were other problematic aspects
of the covenant.42 While there has been little substantive discussion of
35. See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 649, 370 S.E.2d 375, 380
(1988).
36. See, e.g., Sonotone v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 391, 42 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1947)
(finding reasonable a covenant covering the employee's sales territory plus a fifty-mile
radius for twelve months); Orkin v. Wilson, 227 N.C. 96, 99, 40 S.E.2d 696, 698-99 (1946)
(finding reasonable a covenant banning competition for two years in Winston-Salem);
Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N.C. 539, 545, 155 S.E. 154, 157 (1930) (finding
reasonable a covenant banning competition for two years in High Point and within a
fifteen-mile radius).
37. See Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 250, 120 S.E.2d 739, 743
(1961) ("In the cases cited and others, restrictive covenants have been approved for
periods ranging from one to 20 years, and in one instance for the life of the covenanter.").
38. See, e.g., Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 671-73, 9 S.E.2d 476, 477-78 (1940)
(finding a five-year restriction valid and enforceable); cf. Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at
250, 120 S.E.2d at 743 ("Research has not disclosed ...any decision of this [c]ourt in
which five years duration has been declared sufficient to avoid a restrictive covenant.").
39. Farr Assocs. v. Baskin, 138 N.C. App. 276, 280, 530 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2000) ("A
five-year time restriction is the outer boundary which our courts have considered
reasonable ....");see also Lloyd v. S. Elevator Co., No. COA06-944, 2007 N.C. App.
LEXIS 1453, at *13 (July 3, 2007) (citing FarrAssociates for five-year parameter); Okuma
Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 90, 638 S.E.2d 617, 620 (2007) (same);
CNC/Access, Inc. v. Scruggs, No. 04-CVS-1490, 2006 WL 3350854, at *20 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Nov. 15, 2006) (same).
40. FarrAssocs., 138 N.C. App. at 280, 530 S.E.2d at 881; see also Hartman v. W.H.
Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 314-15, 450 S.E.2d 912, 918-20 (1994) (invalidating
five-year non-compete agreement).
41. See, e.g., Okuma, 181 N.C. App. at 92, 638 S.E.2d at 622 (six months); Precision
Walls v. Servie, 152 N.C. App 630, 632, 568 S.E.2d 267, 269 (2002) (one year); Mkt. Am.,
Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 135 N.C. App. 143,146, 153-55, 520 S.E.2d 570, 574, 578-79 (1999)
(six months); Wilmar v. Corsillo, 24 N.C. App. 271, 271, 210 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1974) (one
year). But see Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc. v. Hedgecock, 42 N.C. App. 515, 522-23,
257 S.E.2d 109, 115 (1979) (invalidating one-year covenant on account of vast territorial
restriction).
42. See, e.g., Precision Walls, 152 N.C. App at 638, 568 S.E.2d at 273 (enforcing oneyear non-compete agreement prohibiting any employment with direct competitors and
stating that the court would "evaluate the territorial restriction in light of the relatively
short duration of the time restriction"); see also Wade S. Dunbar Ins. Agency v. Barber,
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the propriety of time restrictions that "d[o] not approach the
treacherous five year boundary, 43 in one recent decision, a North

Carolina Superior Court judge invalidated a three-year restriction in
part due to the short-term nature of the employer's relationships with
customers and the fact that "employee turnover in the industry was
extraordinarily high." 44 Hence, despite repeated references to five

years as the outer boundary of reasonableness, a truer line for
reasonable restrictions is probably somewhere between one and two
years.45
Along with time, territory has proven to be a complex feature of
the courts' analysis, often requiring an examination of the geographic
breadth of an employee's responsibilities or influence. 46 Early cases

followed a similar paradigm: an employee, most often a salesperson
or someone having a defined area of responsibility, entered into a
non-compete agreement with a local company that restricted future
employment within a well-defined geographic region.47 Thus, the
enforceability of the covenant turned on the size of the restricted
region and its relation to the employee's area of responsibility.' Early
jurisprudence indicated that, as with the time restrictions, there might
be an outer limit to the territorial scope a court would allow-even
147 N.C. App. 463, 469, 556 S.E.2d 331, 335-36 (2001) (granting preliminary injunction on
a six-month covenant despite inclusion of prohibition on soliciting employer's customers
with whom employee had no previous contact).
43. See Scruggs, 2006 WL 3350854, at *7.
44. Id. at *7-8. The court's recognition of the "business context" and its relationship
to the length of the non-compete agreement would seem to be a logical extension of the
non-compete jurisprudence, but it has not been picked up by the appellate courts in this
state.
45. Compare VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504, 509 n.1, 606 S.E.2d 359,
362 n.1 (2004) (invalidating two-year covenant), with Precision Walls, 152 N.C. App. 630,
638-39, 568 S.E.2d 267, 273 (2002) (enforcing one-year covenant). But see Kennedy v.
Kennedy, 160 N.C. App. 1, 10, 584 S.E.2d 328, 334 (2003) (enforcing a three-year covenant
spanning a two-county radius).
46. See Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 312, 450 S.E.2d 912,
917 (1994) ("[T]o prove that a geographic restriction in a covenant not to compete is
reasonable, an employer must first show where its customers are located and that the
geographic scope of the covenant is necessary to maintain those customer relationships.").
47. See, e.g., James C. Greene Co. v. Arnold, 266 N.C. 85, 86, 145 S.E.2d 304, 305
(1965) (insurance claims manager entered into non-compete spanning a seventy-five-mile
radius around Elizabeth City); Amdar v. Satterwhite, 37 N.C. App. 410, 411-12, 246
S.E.2d 165, 165-66 (1978) (dance instructor entered into non-compete agreement
spanning a twenty-five-mile radius around a dance studio employer in Raleigh).
48. Compare Greene, 266 N.C. at 86-89, 145 S.E.2d at 305-07 (enforcing seventy-fivemile covenant because it fell within the territory in which employee had made significant
contacts), with Henley Paper Co.v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529, 534-35, 117 S.E.2d 431, 434
(1960) (invalidating covenant covering 300-mile radius in part because territory extended
beyond areas in which employee had worked).
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going so far as deeming nationwide restrictions to be "patently
49
unreasonable.
Beginning in the 1960s, North Carolina courts began hearing
cases that tested the limits on multi-state and nationwide restrictions.
For instance, in the 1966 decision of Engineering Associates v.
Pankow," the Supreme Court of North Carolina invalidated a
covenant restricting a project engineer from working with a
competitor for five years. Although there were no explicit geographic
restrictions in the covenant,'
the employer, an engineering
corporation, was "one of only two such companies in the United
States which are generally recognized as competent in the
development and manufacture of ...custom machinery. ' 52 Despite
the size of the employer's footprint and apparent market share, the
opinion flatly stated that "there can be no doubt of [the covenant's]
53
unreasonableness.
By 1970, this presumption against nationwide covenants was
expressly refuted in Harwell Enterprises,Inc. v. Heim,54 a decision
that also stressed the value of non-compete agreements to protect an
employer's business interests:
Because of the increased technical and scientific knowledge
used in business today, the emphasis placed upon research and
development, the new products and techniques constantly being
developed, the nation-wide activities (even world wide in some
instances) of many business enterprises, and the resulting
competition on a very broad front, the need for such restrictive
covenants to protect the interests of the employer becomes
increasingly important.5 5

49. Comfort Spring Corp. v. Burroughs, 217 N.C. 658,661-62,9 S.E.2d 473,476 (1940)
(calling a restriction spanning the entire United States "unnecessary," "unreasonable,"
and "oppressive"); see also Masterclean of N.C., Inc. v. Guy, 82 N.C. App. 45, 50, 345
S.E.2d 692, 696 (1986) (referring to a nationwide restriction as "patently unreasonable").
50. 268 N.C. 137, 150 S.E.2d 56 (1966).
51. Id. at 139,150 S.E.2d at 58.
52. Id. at 138, 150 S.E.2d at 57.
53. Id. at 139, 150 S.E.2d at 58. The opinion suggested that the covenant would
operate worldwide, but similar covenants have been construed as nationwide restrictions.
See, e.g., Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 135 N.C. App. 143, 153, 520 S.E.2d 570, 578
(1999) ("In the instant case, the non-competition covenant contains no fixed geographic
restriction, but given that Market America is a national company, it is likely that the
covenant is intended to reach the entire United States.").
54. 276 N.C. 475,173 S.E.2d 316 (1970).
55. Id. at 480-81, 173 S.E.2d at 320.
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The Harwell court upheld a nationwide restriction spanning two years
and announced that the "old 6view" of nationwide restraints as
patently unreasonable was gone.1
On its face, the Harwell decision appeared promising, as it
acknowledged the changes in business operations throughout the
country and their effect on the enforceability of covenants not to
compete. Since that decision, however, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has provided little guidance on how to evaluate territorial
restrictions in the wake of continuing changes in business
operations.57 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, for its part, has
identified six factors that relate to the reasonableness of a geographic
restraint, known as the Hartman factors:
(1) the area, or scope, of the restriction; (2) the area assigned to
the employee; (3) the area where the employee actually worked
or was subject to work; (4) the area in which the employer
operated; (5) the nature of the business involved; (6) the nature
of the employee's duty and his knowledge of the employer's
business operation. 8
Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of a
territorial restriction, an employer must "first show where its
customers are located and that the geographic scope of the covenant
is necessary to maintain those customer relationships." 59
If anything, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has made it
more difficult for employers to demonstrate that broad territorial
restrictions should be upheld, and several courts have refused to
enforce covenants because employers have not provided enough
detail about their customer footprint. 60 Moreover, the Hartman

56. Id.
57. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that permissible territorial
restrictions can be defined by reference to a geographic region or a set of client contacts.
See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 651, 370 S.E.2d 375, 381 (1988).
58. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 312, 450 S.E.2d 912, 917
(1994).
59. See Safety Equip. Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Williams, 22 N.C. App. 410, 414, 206
S.E.2d 745, 748 (1974) (discussing state supreme court decisions that have upheld the
validity of broader geographic and time restrictions).
60. See, e.g., Prof'l Liab. Consultants v. Todd, 122 N.C. App. 212, 219, 468 S.E.2d 578,
582 (1996) (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[Employer's] assertion that the covenant's geographic
scope equals its customer base is no more than a tautology."), rev'd, 345 N.C. 176, 478
S.E.2d 201; Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 313, 450 S.E.2d at 917 ("With respect to the
covenants in Articles 13(a) and 13(c), defendant failed to show where its customers were
located.... Mr. Odell's testimony is, at best, an 'indefinite generality' that is insufficient to
support a covenant not to compete.").
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factors were identified in the mid-1970s61 and reflect the types of
cases heard by North Carolina courts up to that time. For that reason,
the Hartman factors provide beneficial guidance for determining the
reasonableness of a covenant in a situation similar to the paradigm
described earlier, in which a salesman or employee with a welldefined area of responsibility is restricted from activities in a
particular region. 62 By contrast, the Hartman factors are of marginal
utility in assessing the reasonableness of restrictions where an
employee does not have a well-defined area of responsibility or where
an employee has general confidential information relating to the
employer's business. 63 These latter types of employment relationships
are increasingly more common, which perhaps explains why North
Carolina courts have rarely analyzed the Hartman factors in recent
cases.
Recognizing the incongruence between the established tests for
evaluating territorial restrictions and modern business practices,
Judge Sanford L. Steelman, Jr. wrote a concurrence in a 2010 North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision calling for the Supreme Court of
North Carolina to take action. Judge Steelman suggested that "[t]he
law of restrictive covenants should be re-evaluated by our Supreme
Court in the context of changing economic conditions to allow
restrictions upon competing business activity for a specific period of
time, limited to a specific, narrow type of business, but with fewer
geographic limitations." 64 In addition to arguing for an evolving view
of geographic restrictions, Judge Steelman's concurrence noted the
need for restrictive covenants to be limited to a narrowly defined type
of business, thus limiting the scope of the restriction. The next Section
further explores the impact of scope in the reasonableness
framework.

61. Clyde Rudd & Assocs. v. Taylor, 29 N.C. App. 679, 684, 225 S.E.2d 602, 605
(1976).
62. See, e.g., Wade S. Dunbar Ins. Agency v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 463, 469, 556
S.E.2d 331, 335-36 (2001) (comparing facts to those in Hartman); CNC/Access, Inc. v.
Scruggs, No. 04-CVS-1490, 2006 WL 3350854, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2006)
(explicitly applying Hartman factors).
63. See, e.g., Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 86, 638 S.E.2d 617, 618
(2007) (Vice President of Marketing); VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504, 509,
606 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2004) (software architect); Precision Walls v. Servie, 152 N.C. App.
630, 638, 568 S.E.2d 267, 273 (2002) (Project Manager).
64. MJM Investigations, Inc., v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *5
(N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010) (Steelman, J., concurring).
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The IncreasingImportanceof Scope

Early decisions assessing covenants not to compete focused on
the reasonableness of the temporal and territorial restrictions, rather
than the scope of employment activity that was prohibited by the
covenant. For instance, in 1930, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
upheld a restriction preventing a store manager from competing in
any way with his former employer, a clothing store, for two years in a
limited area.65 Thirty years later, however, in Henley Paper Co. v.
McAllister,6 the supreme court struck down a non-compete
agreement in part because it excluded the employee from performing
"too many activities."67 In analyzing the scope of employment
restricted by a covenant not to compete, courts have added another
component to the reasonableness calculation.
Henley Paper is instructive, for it exemplifies how North
Carolina courts evaluate the scope of restrictions on employment.
The employer, a wholesale distributor of a variety of paper products,
entered into a non-compete agreement with its employee, a salesman
assigned to the Fine Paper Division of the distributor's business.68
The non-compete agreement restricted the employee from "either
directly or indirectly engag[ing] in the manufacture, sale, or
distribution of paper or paper products."6 9 The court found the scope
to be overbroad in two respects: first, because the employee had been
prohibited from accepting employment that involved the
manufacturing of paper or paper products;70 and second, because the
employee had been restricted from selling other types of paper
products than fine paper products. 7 According to the court, the
employer had a legitimate business interest only in preventing its
employee from taking a similar position with a competitor of the
employer.7 2 Applying this reasoning, subsequent decisions have
highlighted hypothetical scenarios that could arise if the covenant
65. Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N.C. 539, 540-41,155 S.E. 154, 155, 157 (1930).
66. 253 N.C. 529,117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
67. Id. at 534-35, 117 S.E.2d at 434.
68. See id. at 533, 117 S.E.2d at 434.
69. Id. at 531, 117 S.E.2d at 432.
70. Id. at 534, 117 S.E.2d at 434 ("The prohibition would prevent the defendant from
cutting pulpwood or gathering linen rags to be used in the manufacture of paper or paper
products. Nothing need be added to show the conditions have too many ramifications and
impose an undue hardship upon one who had been employed to do no more than sell and
deliver fine paper.").
71. See id.
72. See Med. Staffing Network v. Ridgway, 194 N.C. App. 649, 656, 670 S.E.2d 321,
327 (discussing Henley Paper as support for the proposition that covenants must protect
an employer's legitimate business interests).
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were to be applied as written; the most-often repeated scenario being
that "a covenant would appear to prevent [the employee] from
working as a custodian" for a competitor of the employer.7 3
The heightened focus on the scope of employment restrictions
initially appeared promising, in that courts developed clear rules by
which they analyzed the restrictions. As a general matter, courts held
that restrictive covenants that prevented an employee from working
in any capacity for a competitor were unreasonable,74 while more
narrow scope-based restrictions were evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.75 Yet later cases sometimes overlooked these rules 76 or, worse
yet, applied them in a contradictory manner. For instance, in
Precision Walls v. Servie,17 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
deemed reasonable a one-year non-compete agreement spanning two
states, despite the fact that it prohibited the employee from "directly
or indirectly . . . be[ing] engaged in the Business, or employed,
concerned, or financially interested in any entity engaged in the
Business. '7 8 The court acknowledged the employee's argument that
the covenant, among other restrictions, prevented him from working
in any capacity for a competitor. Nevertheless, it enforced the
covenant because the employee "would not be less likely to disclose
the information and knowledge garnered from his employment ... if

73. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 317, 450 S.E.2d 912, 920
(1994); see also Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 91, 638 S.E.2d 617, 621
(2007) (quoting Hartman); VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504, 509 & n.1, 606
S.E.2d 359, 362-63 & n.1 (2004) (citing Hartman and noting that the broad covenant
restriction would bar employee from "even wholly unrelated work at any firm similar to
VisionAIR").
74. See, e.g., Digital Recorders, Inc. v. McFarland, No. 07-CVS-2247, 2007 WL
2570250, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 29, 2007) ("[C]ourts will not enforce a covenant that,
rather than attempting to prevent a former employee from competing for business, instead
requires the employee 'to have no association whatsoever with any business that provides
[similar] services.'" (quoting Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 317, 450 S.E.2d at 920)). But see
Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523, 528, 379 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1989)
(holding that, where an overly broad scope restriction is separable from the rest of a
reasonable restriction, the court will enforce the reasonable provision). The concept of
separable restrictions will be discussed in more detail in Part II.
75. See, e.g., Med. Staffing, 194 N.C. App. at 656-57, 670 S.E.2d at 327-28 (refusing to
enforce restrictive covenant because employer failed to demonstrate any legitimate
interest for the scope of the restriction).
76. See, e.g., Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 135 N.C. App. 143, 146, 520 S.E.2d
570, 574 (1999) (enforcing covenant prohibiting any participation with companies "using a
similar matrix marketing structure or handling similar products").
77. 152 N.C. App. 630, 568 S.E.2d 267 (2002).
78. Id. at 632, 568 S.E.2d at 269.
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he worked for one of [the employer's] competitors in a position
different from the one in which he worked for [the employer]. 7 9
The outcome in Precision Walls and the reasoning espoused by
the court are troubling, particularly as they pertain to the continued
vitality of the scope-of-employment analysis. Presumably every time
an employee leaves one position and obtains employment with a
competitor, even in a wholly unrelated capacity, the employee will
"likely feel the same pressure to disclose [confidential]
information."8 If this idea were taken to its logical conclusion, there
would be few limits on the types of permissible non-compete
agreements.
Not surprisingly, decisions subsequent to Precision Walls have
had difficulty squaring the outcome of that case with the rest of the
non-compete jurisprudence. In VisionAIR, Inc. v. James,81 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals was again faced with a non-compete
agreement that was broad in scope, prohibiting the employee from
"own[ing], manag[ing], be[ing] employed by or otherwise
participat[ing] in, directly or indirectly, any business similar to
[e]mployer's [business]."
Despite the similarities between the
covenants in the two cases, the VisionAIR court found that the
covenant was overbroad. 83 According to the court, the covenant
"prevented [the employee] from doing even wholly unrelated work at
any firm similar to VisionAIR," as well as "prohibited [the employee]
from holding interest in a mutual fund invested in part in a firm
engaged in business similar to VisionAIR." In a footnote, the court
acknowledged the apparent contradiction with Precision Walls;
however, it went on to recast Precision Walls as standing for the
proposition that "it is within [the employer's] legitimate business
interest to prohibit [the employee] from working in an identical
position."85 Later decisions have likewise relied on this framing of

79. Id. at 639, 568 S.E.2d at 273.
80. See id.
81. 167 N.C. App. 504,606 S.E.2d 359 (2004).
82. Id. at 506,606 S.E.2d at 361.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 508-509, 606 S.E.2d at 362-63. Later cases have drawn parallels to mutual
fund holdings in invalidating non-compete agreements. See, e.g., CNC/Access, Inc. v.
Scruggs, No. 04-CVS-1490, 2006 WL 3350854, at *8-9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2006)
(analogizing covenant to that at issue in VisionAIR); Digital Recorders, Inc. v. McFarland,
No. 07 CVS 2247, 2007 WL 2570250, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 29, 2007).
85. VisionAIR, 167 N.C. App. at 509 n.1, 606 S.E.2d at 362-63 n.1 (emphasis added).
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Precision Walls, rather than on its substance, in evaluating non86
compete agreements.
C.

Employee Role and Value Weighed by Courts

In Scott v. Gillis, the court acknowledged the role of restrictive
covenants in employment contracts, referring to a covenant not to
compete as "especially applicable to agreements by assistants to
professional men."87 Since then, cases involving covenants not to
compete have dealt with a variety of levels and types of employees.
However, most cases involving such covenants deal with sales or
management-level employees, who by the very nature of their
employment are privy to customer lists, marketing strategies, and
other confidential information.8 8
Early jurisprudence indicated that the skill or ability of the
employee should have no bearing on the reasonableness of the
covenant.8 9 Nevertheless, almost since the very beginning of the
analysis of such covenants, it was clear that the particular role of the
employee-which necessarily implicates skill or ability-factored into
the determination of reasonableness. 90 In part, courts were concerned

86. See, e.g., Med. Staffing Network v. Ridgway, 194 N.C. App. 649, 656, 670 S.E.2d
321, 327 (2009); Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 86, 638 S.E.2d 617, 618
(2007); DigitalRecorders, 2007 WL 2570250, at *4.
87. Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 227, 148 S.E. 315, 317 (1929) (quoting MCKINNEY &
RICH, supra note 27, § 206, at 806) ("Few professional men would take assistants... unless
they were assured that the knowledge and skill imparted and the friendships and
associations formed would not be used, when the services were ended, to appropriate the
very business such assistants were employed to maintain and enlarge." (quoting
MCKINNEY & RICH, supra note 27, § 206, at 806)).
88. See generally Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 327 N.C. 224, 393 S.E.2d 854
(1990) (manager); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. O'Hanlon, 243 N.C. 457, 91 S.E.2d 222
(1956) (manager); Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947)
(manager); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wilson, 227 N.C. 96, 40 S.E.2d 696 (1946)
(manager); Moskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 199 N.C. 539, 155 S.E. 154 (1930) (manager);
Kohler Co. v. Mclvor, 177 N.C. App. 396, 628 S.E.2d 817 (2006) (sales representative);
QSP, Inc. v. Hair, 152 N.C. App. 174, 566 S.E.2d 851 (2002) (sales representative); Wilmar,
Inc. v. Corsillo, 24 N.C. App. 271, 210 S.E.2d 427 (1974) (sales representative).
89. Scott, 197 N.C. at 228, 148 S.E. at 317 ("There is nothing in the law ... which
makes unique skill or ability a factor in the case. It is simply a question of reasonable
protection to the employer ... against competition by the covenantor who has received
consideration for the covenant." (citing Sarco Co. of New Jersey v. Gulliver, 129 A. 399,
402 (N.J. Ch. 1925))).
90. See Sonotone, 227 N.C. at 390,42 S.E.2d at 355 ("A workman who has nothing but
his labor to sell and is in urgent need of selling that may unwittingly accede to an
unguarded restriction at the time of employment, but one who is competent to serve as
District Manager of a large corporation is supposed to understand and fully appreciate the
significance of his engagements." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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with the difference in business acumen between lower-level and
higher-level employees, as the former
may readily accede to an unreasonable restriction at the time of

his employment without taking proper thought of the morrow,
but a professional man who is the product of modern university
or college education . . . should [be able] to guard his own
interest, especially when dealing with an associate on equal
terms.91
Courts also "attached significance to the fact of an employee's

managerial position" because of "[t]he employee's opportunity to
acquire intimate knowledge of the business and to develop personal
92
association with customers.
Although North Carolina courts ostensibly consider the
employee's role in determining the reasonableness of a covenant not
to compete, the employee's place in the organizational hierarchy
currently does not figure prominently in the traditional tests for
judging the time, territory, or scope of the covenant.93 Increasingly,
however, it is these higher-level employees who are litigating the
enforceability of their non-compete agreements.94 In Okuma America
Corp. v. Bowers,9 for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals

determined that a non-compete agreement prohibiting employment
with competitors throughout North and South America may be
reasonable. 96 The court stressed that the employee was "one of the six

most senior executives in the company," possessed considerable
confidential information, and functioned as a key decisionmaker. 97
This decision seems to reflect an even greater willingness to enforce

91. Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 673-74, 9 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1940).
92. Manpower v. Hedgecock, 42 N.C. App. 515,521,257 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1979).
93. Arguably the employee's role is captured in part by the sixth Hartman factor: "the
nature of the employee's duty and his knowledge of the employer's business operation."
Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 312, 450 S.E.2d 912, 917 (1994).
However, that test relates only to the geographic reach of the restriction. See id.
94. See, e.g., Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 86, 638 S.E.2d 617, 618
(2007) (Vice President of Customer Service); Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. McGuirt, No. 06
CVS 13493, 2006 WL 3720430, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006) (Senior Vice
President); MJM Investigations, Inc. v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *1
(N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010) (Assistant Vice President of International Investigations).
95. 181 N.C. App. 85,638 S.E.2d 617 (2007).
96. Id. at 86,638 S.E.2d at 618.
97. Id. at 91, 638 S.E.2d at 621.
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covenants against the most senior members of management teams or
sales departments.98
In the eighty years since North Carolina first recognized the
enforceability of covenants not to compete between employers and
employees, courts have emphasized that the reasonableness of a
covenant must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, leaving "no broadly applicable benchmarks to
follow."99 In some respects, this type of case-by-case analysis is to be

expected given the nature of the standard by which covenants not to
compete are judged. However, the tests by which courts determine
reasonableness are themselves incongruous with the ways that
companies conduct operations in the twenty-first century-operations
that often involve business transactions of indefinite length and
interactions with customers irrespective of geographical location. 1°°
Furthermore, the types of employees challenging covenants not to
compete have broadened to encompass higher-level employees,
whose value is not tied to a particular geographic region, but rather to
the operations of the business as a whole. 10 I
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S USE OF THE STRICT BLUE PENCIL
DOCTRINE TO ENFORCE UNREASONABLE COVENANTS

As discussed in Part I, North Carolina courts developed a
framework for evaluating the reasonableness of covenants not to
compete based on a business model that has become increasingly less
common in the modern workplace. The disparity between this
framework and the nature of employers' concerns has created more
uncertainty in the enforceability of covenants that may be litigated.
This Part raises a related issue that exacerbates this uncertainty: the
extent to which North Carolina courts may enforce otherwise
overbroad covenants by applying the strict blue pencil doctrine.
98. See, e.g., id.; Wachovia Ins., 2006 WL 3720430, at *2, *11 (enforcing covenant
against former Senior Vice President).
99. CNC/Access, Inc. v. Scruggs, No. 04-CVS-1490, 2006 WL 3350854, at *7 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2006).
100. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF
HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 256 (2000)

("Many [businesses] are migrating from geography to cyberspace and, in the process,
loosening or even severing their traditional ties to geography."); Uchitelle, supra note 30
(discussing the rapid push for globalization among small businesses).
101. Cf Peter Cappelli & Monika Hamori, The New Road to the Top, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 5, 25 ("Today's top managers of Fortune 100 companies are
fundamentally different ....[T]hey are increasingly moving from one company to another
as their careers unfold."). Between 1980 and 2001, the mean tenure for executives declined
by five years. Id. at 28.
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Traditionally, if a covenant not to compete was deemed
unreasonable, North Carolina courts refused to enforce any part of
the covenant. 1 2 Courts examined the covenant in its entirety and thus
10 3
could not amend it to "make a new contract for the parties."
1 ° the
However, in Welcome Wagon International, Inc. v. Pender,
Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized a limited judicial
remedy for excising unreasonable portions of covenants. 5 Under
North Carolina's version of the blue pencil doctrine, which is often
termed the "strict blue pencil doctrine" because of its limited
application, 0 6 an unreasonable provision that is determined to be
separable from the remainder of an otherwise reasonable covenant
will be struck out and the remaining covenant enforced according to
its terms.10 7 Even with the supreme court's adoption of the strict blue
pencil doctrine, a court may not modify the terms of an unreasonable
covenant, 0 8 nor may it strike out unreasonable portions of a nonseparable covenant. 10 9 This Part discusses the adoption of the strict
blue pencil doctrine, examines its infrequent application in North
Carolina's non-compete jurisprudence, and identifies the limitations
of this doctrine in providing a fair or predictable outcome for
employers or employees.
A.

North Carolina'sAdoption of the Strict Blue Pencil Doctrine

The Supreme Court of North Carolina first squarely addressed
the issue of whether any part of an unreasonable covenant not to
compete could be enforced in the 1947 decision of Noe v. McDevitt." °
Its position was stated clearly and concisely: "The court cannot by
102. See Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242,245, 45 S.E.2d 121,123 (1947).
103. Id. at 245, 45 S.E.2d at 123; see also Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529,
535, 117 S.E.2d 431, 434-35 (1960) ("[The contract] comes to us as a single document. We
must construe it as the parties made it.").
104. 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
105. Id. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742.
106. See Pivateau, supra note 13, at 682-88 (discussing different approaches to the blue
pencil doctrine and categorizing North Carolina as a strict blue pencil state); see also infra
Part III.
107. See Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742 ("[W]here, as here, the
parties have made divisions of the territory, a court of equity will take notice of the
divisions the parties themselves have made, and enforce the restrictions in the territorial
divisions deemed reasonable and refuse to enforce them in divisions deemed
unreasonable.").
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 317, 450 S.E.2d
912, 920 (1994) (noting the blue pencil doctrine's availability only for "distinctly
separable" covenants).
110. 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
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splitting up the territory make a new contract for the parties-it must
stand or fall integrally."'' The court elaborated on its hands-off
approach thirteen years later in Henley Paper v. McAllister,112

trumpeting the paramount importance of honoring the parties'
freedom to contract." 3 According to the Henley Paper court,
"[w]hether part of the contract might be deemed reasonable and
enforceable is not the question. It comes to114us as a single document.
'
We must construe it as the parties made it.
In 1961, less than a year after Henley Paper was decided, the
supreme court reversed course in Welcome Wagon. The language of
the covenant at issue in Welcome Wagon restricted competition in
four geographic areas:
(1) in Fayetteville, North Carolina, or (2) in any other city,
town, borough, township, village or other place in the State of
North Carolina, in which the Company is then engaged in
rendering its said service, (3) in any city, town, borough,
township, village or other place in the United States in which
the Company is then engaged in rendering its said service, or
(4) in any city, town, borough, township or village in the United
States in which the Company has been or has signified its
intentions to be, engaged in rendering its said service." 5
Despite determining that the latter two provisions restricting
competition throughout the United States were unreasonable and
unenforceable, the court found that the provision restricting
competition in Fayetteville was reasonable and held that it could be
enforced." 6 After acknowledging the rules laid out in Noe and Henley
Paper,the Welcome Wagon court continued: "[W]here, as here, the
parties have made divisions of the territory, a court of equity will take
notice of the divisions the parties themselves have made, and enforce
the restrictions in the territorial divisions deemed reasonable and
refuse to enforce them in the divisions deemed unreasonable."" 7
Thus, the supreme court announced a new equitable doctrine to
permit North Carolina courts to partially enforce unreasonable
111. Id. at 245, 45 S.E.2d at 123.
112. 253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
113. Id. at 535, 117 S.E.2d at 434-35.
114. Id.
115. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 246, 120 S.E.2d 739, 740
(1961).
116. Id. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742. The opinion did not determine whether the second
provision, which restricted competition throughout North Carolina, was reasonable. See
id.
117. Id.
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covenants; however, such authority is limited to covenants that are
written so 1 that the unreasonable terms are "divisible" or
"separable."' 8
Notwithstanding its departure from past precedent, the Welcome
Wagon court did not provide a normative rationale for adopting the
strict blue pencil doctrine; rather, it merely noted that the approach
had been adopted by a majority of states at the time." 9 If anything,
the court's cursory treatment of the issue suggests that it did not view
the strict blue pencil doctrine as a significant departure from its prior
precedent. 2 On the other hand, the dissent, authored by Justice
William Haywood Bobbitt, focused on the majority's adoption of the
strict blue pencil doctrine, which it called "simple and convenient
[but] unsound."'' in fact, the dissent pointed out that the covenant in
Henley Paper had listed several types of prohibited activities in a
similar fashion as the covenant in Welcome Wagon, and yet that
opinion did not address the possibility of blue penciling the activities
that were considered unreasonable. 2 2 Justice Bobbitt warned that
it so
North Carolina's adoption of the strict blue pencil doctrine made
23
that "legality... depend[s] upon form rather than substance."'
B.

The Limited and InconsistentApplication of the Strict Blue Pencil
Doctrine

In one sense, Justice Bobbitt's concerns about the adoption of
the strict blue pencil doctrine in North Carolina have been
unfounded, for it rarely has been successfully applied to save an
unreasonable covenant. As noted by the majority opinion in Welcome
Wagon, courts still may not "vary or reform the contract by reducing

118. See id. Although the Welcome Wagon opinion did not use the term "separable,"
courts now use that term to describe the type of covenant that is subject to the blue pencil
doctrine. See, e.g., Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523, 528, 379 S.E.2d
824, 828 (1989) ("If the contract is separable, however, and one part is reasonable, the
courts will enforce the reasonable provision.").
119. See Welcome Wagon, 255 NC. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742 (citing cases from
Delaware and Indiana as well as two contract law treatises).
120. See id.
dissenting).
121. Id. at 255, 120 S.E.2d at 747 (Bobbitt, J.,
122. See id. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 748 ("McAllister, a salesman, was engaged exclusively
in the sale and distribution of paper products. The covenant, for a period of three years
after the termination of his contract, restricted him from engaging in the manufacture,
sale, or distribution of paper or paper products.... If we had applied the blue pencil rule,
we would have disregarded the word manufacture and would have enforced the provision
to the extent it related to sales and distribution." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. Id.
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either the territory or the time covered by the restrictions."' 2 4
Subsequent decisions have reiterated the doctrine's narrow scope:
When the language of a covenant not to compete is overly
broad, North Carolina's "blue pencil" rule severely limits what
the court may do to alter the covenant. A court at most may
choose not to enforce a distinctly separable part of a covenant
in order to render the provision reasonable.
It may not
12 5
otherwise revise or rewrite the covenant.
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that there are few cases in
which North Carolina courts have applied the doctrine.126
Wachovia Insurance Services, Inc. v. McGuirt"2 is a recent
example of a trial court applying the strict blue pencil doctrine to
enforce part of a restrictive covenant. The employee was a senior
vice-president for Wachovia Insurance Services ("WIS").'28 In
Paragraph 6(a) of the covenant at issue, the employee was prohibited
from soliciting or servicing clients with whom he had previously
worked while in his position at WIS. 29 Paragraph 6(a) further
provided that the employee was permitted to solicit or service other
WIS clients if the employee had not worked with those clients during
the previous two years and knew no confidential information about
them. 3° Paragraph 6(b) of the covenant, on the other hand,
"impos[ed] a conclusive presumption deeming [the employee] to have
violated the terms of the covenant if any WIS client, regardless of [the
employee's] contact or relationship with that client, le[ft] WIS in
favor of [the employee's] new employer."'' The court determined
that Paragraph 6(a) contained reasonable restrictions but Paragraph
6(b) rendered the covenant unreasonable because it prohibited the
employee from working on accounts unrelated to his position at WIS.
124. Id. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742; see also Pivateau, supra note 13, at 685 (discussing
how one court explained the blue pencil approach: "[t]he blue pencil marks, but does not
write" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 317, 450 S.E.2d 912, 920
(1994) (finding that the covenant at issue was not "distinctly separable").
126. Cf.Herbert, supra note 2, at 265 ("The robust body of case law dealing with the
reasonableness standards for noncompetition agreements reveals an unmistakable and
pervasive conservativism in courts' interpretations of these agreements. The origin of such
conservativism has been the consistent and deliberate intent of enforcing restrictive
covenants only to the extent necessary to protect an employer's legitimate business
interests.").
127. No. 06-CVS-13593, 2006 WL 3720430 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006).
128. Id. at *1-2.
129. Id. at *2, *9.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *11.
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Despite acknowledging the limitations of the strict blue pencil
doctrine, the court found that this case was "the exception" and
struck out Paragraph 6(b)13 2 from the covenant and enforced the
remainder of the covenant.
The unreasonable restriction at issue in Wachovia Insurance was
uniquely suited to being blue penciled because it was contained in a
separate paragraph-indicating that it was "distinctly separable"and the other restrictions in the covenant were not dependent on that
paragraph for enforcement. Indeed, the Wachovia Insurance opinion
noted that Paragraph 6(b) was "inconsistent[]" with the remainder of
the covenant. 33 In other cases, however, courts have declined to blue
pencil a covenant because the unreasonable restriction was not
separable from the remainder of the covenant. For example, in MJM
Investigations, Inc. v. Sjostedt, 3 4 the parties entered into a covenant
that contained both a non-compete provision and a non-solicitation
provision."' The trial court determined that the non-compete
provision, which contained a time restriction of two years, was
unreasonable because of its "fail[ure] to confine itself to any
geographic territory."' 3 6 On the other hand, the trial court determined
that the non-solicitation provision was reasonable and attempted to
enforce it by excising the non-compete provision from the
covenant.137 The appellate court reversed, finding that the noncompete provision was not distinctly separable from the remainder of
the covenant. 13 8 Despite the fact that the two provisions were
contained in separate clauses, only the non-compete provision
included the two-year time restriction.3 9 Because a time restriction
was required for enforcing the non-solicitation provision, the nonsolicitation provision was deemed dependent upon the overbroad

132. Id. ("[T]he Court finds that it may excise the overly broad language of paragraph
6(b) of the covenant, while giving effect to the remaining terms."). At the outset, it was
not clear whether courts could "blue pencil" provisions other than territorial restrictions.
See Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 248, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961).
Subsequent decisions clarified that the strict blue pencil doctrine could be applied to other
unreasonable provisions. See, e.g., Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523,379
S.E.2d 824 (1989) (applying blue pencil doctrine to restriction on scope of employment).
133. Wachovia Ins., 2006 WL 3720430, at *11.
134. No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at *2-3.
138. Id. at *4-5.
139. See id. at *5 ("[Wlhen the trial court 'blue-penciled' the agreement, it struck the
entire first sentence, which ... included the only time restriction in the agreement. The
remaining non-solicitation clause includes no time restriction ....).
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non-compete provision and could not be saved by blue penciling the

covenant.140
MJM Investigations is but one example of the difficulties courts

have faced in applying the strict blue pencil doctrine, and appellate
court decisions are littered with instances in which a trial court has
improperly blue penciled an unreasonable covenant. 4 ' In part, this

difficulty stems from the doctrine's formalism, including its
requirement that the unreasonable restriction be distinctly separable
from the remainder of the covenant. 42 This form-over-substance
problem is what Justice Bobbitt warned about in his Welcome Wagon

dissent."3 As an example, he posited that if the covenant in that case
had restricted the employee from working "throughout the United
States and Canada, the restriction would be held wholly unreasonable

and void," but if the language restricted the employee from working
in "Fayetteville or elsewhere in the United States and Canada, the
restriction w[ould] be enforced in Fayetteville."'" Indeed, cases in
which courts decline to apply the blue pencil doctrine seem to reflect
poorly drafted covenants rather than wholly overbroad restrictions.'45
The requirement that the unreasonable restriction be distinctly

separable from the remainder of the covenant also has produced
seemingly contradictory results, particularly when a covenant's
restrictions are not contained in separate clauses. For instance, in
Schultz v. Ingram,146 the parties had entered into a covenant

prohibiting the employee from "compet[ing] with the Principal's or
Associate's business within any area or areas from time to time
constituting the Principal's or Associate's area of activity in the
140. Id. ("A non-solicitation clause without any time restriction is clearly too broad
and, therefore, unenforceable, no matter the scope of the territorial limitation.").
141. See, e.g., Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 309-11,450 S.E.2d
912, 915-16 (1994) (affirming trial court's decision recognizing impermissible blue
penciling of overbroad provision); Se. Outdoor Prods., Inc. v. Lawson, No. COA04-1545,
2005 WL 1950247, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2005) (reversing the trial court's use of
the blue pencil doctrine to rewrite an overly broad covenant).
142. See Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 317,450 S.E.2d at 920.
143. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 256, 120 S.E.2d 739, 747
(1961) (Bobbitt, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 747.
145. See, e.g., MJM Investigations, 2010 WL 2814531, at *5 (declining to blue pencil
agreement because overbroad non-compete clause contained the only time restriction); Se.
Outdoor Prods., 2005 WL 1950247, at *3 (reversing the trial court's decision to partially
enforce an overly broad territorial restriction); Elec. S. Inc. v. Lewis, 96 N.C. App. 160,
166-67, 385 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1989) (discussing ambiguity of conjunction "or" in regard to
whether language of covenant was separable and ultimately declining to blue pencil
covenant).
146. 38 N.C. App. 422, 248 S.E.2d 345 (1978).
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' The employee argued that
conduct of their respective businesses." 147
the covenant was unenforceable because it restricted competition in
the Principal's area of activity, which rendered the covenant
unreasonable.148 In affirming the trial court's decision to order a
preliminary injunction that covered only the Associate's area of
activity, the appellate court applied the blue pencil doctrine--despite

its

acknowledgment

that

"the

areas

are

not

enumerated

' 149

separately.
Although the appellate court noted that it acted
"without altering or amending the contract," this seems improbable
given that the covenant further stated that the employee was
forbidden to compete "in the conduct of their respective
businesses."'5 ° Moreover, even when covenants contain unreasonable
terms that are connected with reasonable terms using the conjunction

"or," as in Schultz, other courts have not always applied the strict
blue pencil doctrine."'
C.

The Hidden Effects of North Carolina'sBlue Pencil Doctrine

While the effects of the strict blue pencil doctrine are obvious in
the cases highlighted in the previous Section, the effects of the

doctrine may reach even further, impacting cases in which courts
never ostensibly discuss the doctrine at all. These "hidden effects" are

more difficult to quantify, but they may serve to explain
inconsistencies
in North
Carolina's
recent non-compete
jurisprudence.
As discussed more fully in Part I.C, over the past twenty years
there has been a noticeable shift in the substance of non-compete
agreements being litigated North Carolina courts due to changes in
business operations and in the nature of employment relationships.
147. Id. at 424, 248 S.E.2d at 347.
148. Id. at 429-30, 248 S.E.2d at 350-51.
149. Id. at 429, 248 S.E.2d at 351.
150. See id. at 429, 248 S.E.2d at 350-51 (emphasis added); see also Welcome Wagon
Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 256, 120 S.E.2d 739, 747 (1961) (Bobbitt, J., dissenting)
("Under the 'blue pencil' rule, the court will not divide territory but will divide what is
essentially a single restrictive covenant. The restrictive covenant, according to its terms,
applies to all territory described therein in exactly the same manner it applies to
Fayetteville.").
151. Compare Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742 (striking
unreasonable provisions in a string of territorial provisions connected by "or"), with
Carolina Pride Carwash v. Kendrick, No. COA04-451, 2005 WL 2276904, at *1 (N.C. Ct.
App. Sept. 20, 2005) (refusing to blue pencil a provision restricting competition in "North
Carolina, South Carolina, or Virginia" (emphasis added)); Elec. S. Inc. v. Lewis, 96 N.C.
App. 160, 166-67, 385 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1989) (finding "or" to be conjunctive rather than
disjunctive and refusing to use the blue pencil doctrine).
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Relatively fewer covenants follow the traditional paradigm in which a
salesperson or similar type of employee is restricted from competing
in the employee's assigned locale.'52 Instead, courts are increasingly
evaluating non-compete agreements in which employees, who are
often in senior management or executive positions, have been
restricted from accepting any type of employment with competitors,
and such covenants are rarely limited to well-defined geographic
regions.' Not only have the standards for judging a covenant's
reasonableness not adapted to changes in business practices, but the
strict blue pencil doctrine has not changed since its adoption in
1961.1 4 This latter point is significant because the types of covenants
that most lend themselves to being blue penciled are those that fit the
traditional paradigm: covenants in which the territorial restriction
may be expressed in separate clauses and the scope-of-employment
restriction is denoted by particular categories of positions. 55 It is
perhaps no coincidence, then, that there are few recent reported cases
in which courts have successfully applied the doctrine. 156
Faced with these new types of covenants, and without the aid of
an effective equitable tool to partially enforce unreasonable
covenants, North Carolina courts are given a Hobson's choice: they
may either refuse to enforce a covenant because it fails to meet the
traditional tests of reasonableness, or they may enforce a covenant in
its entirety against an employee despite its apparent overbreadth.
VisionAIR and Medical Staffing Network v. Ridgway 57 are two
cases that illustrate the first option. In those cases, which involved a
152. See supra Part I.
153. See supra Part 1.
154. See, e.g., Outdoor Lighting Perspectives Franchising, Inc. v. Harders, No. 12 CVS
4430, 2012 WL 1693887, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 14, 2012) ("The North Carolina
Supreme Court has suggested that blue penciling may be appropriate to enforce a
distinctly separable part of the covenant (citing Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255
N.C. 244, 248, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961)). But blue penciling does not allow a court to
otherwise revise or rewrite the agreement between the parties."); see also MJM
Investigations, Inc. v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App.
July 20,2010).
155. See, e.g., Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 324 N.C. 523, 528, 379 S.E.2d 824,
828 (1989) (covenant provided that employee was prohibited from "engag[ing] in the
business of manufacturing, selling, renting, or distributing any goods manufactured, sold,
rented, or distributed by the Employer during the term of his employment" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742 (involving
territories expressed in numbered clauses); Masterclean of N.C., Inc. v. Guy, 82 N.C. App.
45, 46, 345 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986) (same).
156. But see, e.g., Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. McGuirt, No. 06-CVS-13593, 2006 WL
3720430, at *11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006) (applying the strict blue pencil doctrine).
157. 194 N.C. App. 649,670 S.E.2d 321 (2009).
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software architect and local branch manager, respectively, the courts
refused to enforce the covenants because the restrictions on the scope

of employment were overbroad. 5 8 Both cases cited and applied the
traditional rule, first announced in Henley Paper, that "restrictive
covenants are unenforceable where they prohibit the employee from
engaging in future work that is distinct from the duties actually
performed by the employee."' 59
Okuma and Precision Walls, on the other hand, reflect courts

that have elected the second option. The covenants at issue in both
cases went further than merely restricting the employees from taking
positions that were "distinct" from those currently performed; they in
fact restricted the employees from being "directly or indirectly"
employed with a competitor in any capacity.' Notwithstanding the

seemingly bright-line rules regarding the reasonableness of scope-ofemployment restrictions, both courts found that the covenants could
be enforced.

161

By examining the Okuma and Precision Walls opinions, one can
surmise several reasons why those courts did not follow the strictures
of the traditional reasonableness analysis. First, the employees
involved in the two cases, an Estimator/Project Manager and Vice
President of Customer Service, respectively, were high-level
employees and had access to valuable confidential informationinformation that the Precision Walls opinion indicated the employee
could feel "pressure[d]" to reveal, even if employed in an unrelated
capacity.162 Second, both courts stressed the fact that the employees
had, in fact, taken an "identical position" with a direct competitor
after they had resigned from their positions. 163 It is well established

that the type of position an employee takes after the termination of
158. VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 167 N.C. App. 504, 508-09, 606 S.E.2d 359, 362-63
(2004); Med. Staffing, 194 N.C. App. at 655-57,670 S.E. 2d at 327-28.
159. Med. Staffing, 194 N.C. App. at 656, 670 S.E.2d at 327; accord VisionAIR, 167
N.C. App. at 509, 606 S.E.2d at 363 (stating that broad restrictions preventing employees
from working in "wholly unrelated" areas "cannot be enforced").
160. Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85, 86-87, 638 S.E.2d 617, 618-19
(2007); Precision Walls v. Servie, 152 N.C. App. 630, 632, 568 S.E.2d 267, 269 (2002).
161. Okuma, 181 N.C. App. at 88-92, 638 S.E.2d at 620-22; Precision Walls, 152 N.C.
App. at 636-40, 568 S.E.2d at 272-74; see also Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Christman-Orth, 135 N.C.
App. 143, 146, 152-55, 520 S.E.2d 570, 574, 577-79 (1999) (upholding nationwide covenant
restricting any employment with competitor).
162. Precision Walls, 152 N.C. App. at 639, 568 S.E.2d at 273; see Okuma, 181 N.C.
App. at 91, 638 S.E.2d at 621 (describing employee as "one of the six most senior
executives in the company" with knowledge of "the most critical and strategic decisions
made by the company").
163. Okuma, 181 N.C. App. at 91, 638 S.E.2d at 621; Precision Walls, 152 N.C. App. at
638, 568 S.E.2d at 273.
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employment should have no bearing on whether a covenant not to
compete is reasonable; 164 indeed, it is this type of fact pattern that
gives rise to litigation over a covenant's enforceability. Yet it appears
that equitable concerns did impact both decisions, and this type of
sentiment is not unfamiliar in North Carolina non-compete
jurisprudence. According to an often-quoted passage from a 1947
supreme court decision:
There is no ambiguity in the restrictive covenant. It was
inserted for the protection of the plaintiff, and to inhibit the
defendant, from doing what he now proposes to do ....

The

parties regarded it as reasonable and desirable when
incorporated in the contract. Subsequent events, as disclosed by
the record, tend to confirm, rather than refute, this belief ....

.. . In undertaking to change horses for what the defendant
regards a better mount, he is reminded of his obligation to the
steed which1 brought
him safely to midstream and readied him
65
for the shift.
Given the limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine as an
equitable tool to mollify the effect of unreasonable covenant terms,
North Carolina courts are increasingly finding themselves in the same
position as their earlier counterparts prior to the Welcome Wagon
decision-they must either enforce covenants as written or decline to
enforce any portion of them. And without the appropriate legal tools
for evaluating a covenant's reasonableness, a court may turn to other
equitable principles to guide this decision.
III. REEXAMINING THE JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO
UNREASONABLE COVENANTS

Although common law courts in the 18th century were faced with
ruling on the validity of restraints of trade, 16 6 there have been several
eras in which legal professionals, academics, and policymakers have

164. See Shute v. Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 282, 42 S.E. 704, 704 (1902) (establishing that
the reasonableness of a covenant is to be decided as a matter of law); see, e.g., Beasley v.
Banks, 90 N.C. App. 458, 368 S.E.2d 885 (1998) (invalidating restrictive covenant that
employee had admittedly breached on account of the breadth of the territorial restriction).
165. Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 390-91, 42 S.E.2d 352, 354-55 (1947).
166. Blake, supra note 8, at 629 (discussing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.
1711), which has been identified as one of the most prominent early decisions regarding
covenants not to compete).
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vigorously debated the enforceability and enforcement mechanisms

for covenants not to compete. One such era spanned the early 1960s,
around the time that the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted
the strict blue pencil doctrine. According to Professor Harlan Blake,
who authored the influential 1960 article Employee Agreements Not
to Compete, this focus was due to the competitive market for highly
trained employees as well as the uncertainty surrounding whether and
how courts would enforce covenants containing overbroad terms.1 67
Indeed, Blake's article suggested that the blue pencil doctrine, despite
its limitations, could best serve the competing interests of employers
168

and employees.
Another such era began near the turn of the twenty-first century
and has continued to the present. One reason cited for the renewed

focus on restrictive covenants is the transformation in the United
States from a manufacturing-based economy to a knowledge- or
information-based economy. 169 Another reason, related to the first, is
the changing concept of the employment relationship from one of
long-term stability and mutual loyalty to a more fluid workplace-

one in which employees are incentivized to accept employment on the
basis of the knowledge and skills they will acquire, rather than on
employers' promises of long-term job security and commitment. 70

Despite the flurry of activity in other jurisdictions, 71 both the
Supreme Court of North Carolina and the North Carolina legislature
have remained silent. Their inaction is especially troubling given the

inconsistency in the state's non-compete jurisprudence over the past
twenty years-an inconsistency that is not surprising given the vast
changes in the economy and the nature of the employment

167. Id. at 627-28.
168. See id. at 681-84.
169. See Shogun J. Khadye, Comment, An Uncertain Future: Georgia's Policy on
Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 2 J. MARSHALL L.J. 208, 231-39 (2009)
(identifying state trends in squaring non-compete agreements with the modern
information-based economy). See generally Bishara, supra note 22 (discussing the role of
and implications for using non-compete agreements in a knowledge-based economy);
Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5 (using examples from Microsoft and Google as case
studies and focusing on shifts in knowledge-based economy).
170. See, e.g., Bishara, supra note 22, at 292; see also Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan,
Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 389, 389-93 (2010) (discussing employee mobility and enforcement of
non-compete agreements).
171. See, e.g., Khadye, supra note 169, at 226-31 (detailing actions taken by the
Georgia legislature over the last twenty years regarding the enforcement of restrictive
covenants); Steiner, supra note 23, at 27-29 (analyzing recent statutory provisions
governing restrictive covenants in Idaho).
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relationship. 172 Although there are several aspects of North Carolina's
non-compete jurisprudence that could be reevaluated, this Part
examines the use of the strict blue pencil doctrine to partially enforce
covenants that include unreasonable terms. Besides the strict blue
pencil doctrine, there are two competing approaches that have been
adopted in other jurisdictions. Courts applying the all-or-nothing
approach refuse to enforce any covenant containing an unreasonable
restriction, whereas courts applying the judicial modification
approach may strike out or modify a restriction to render the
covenant reasonable and then enforce the covenant as altered. 173 This
Part examines the advantages and limitations of all three approaches,
and it ultimately recommends that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina adopt a variant of the judicial modification approach.
A. All-or-Nothing: Voiding UnreasonableCovenants
The all-or-nothing approach, also called the "no modification"
rule,' 74 is not unfamiliar to North Carolina courts, as it was the

approach used prior to the adoption of the strict blue pencil doctrine.
In an all-or-nothing jurisdiction, a court will neither revise nor
eliminate any provisions of the covenant. Instead, the court will
determine the reasonableness of the covenant as written.7 5 Although
the all-or-nothing approach at one time had fallen out of favor, the
76
approach has recently received positive scholarly attention.1
Virginia and Wisconsin are two states that still follow the all-ornothing approach. 177

172. See supra Part I.
173. Swift, supra note 12, at 245.
174. See, e.g., Orelup & Drewry, supra note 7, at 31-32.
175. See Pivateau, supra note 13, at 682; see also Khadye, supra note 169, at 214
(discussing the no-modification rule in Georgia).
176. See, e.g., John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49,
77 (2002) (indicating preference for all-or-nothing approach); Pivateau, supra note 13, at
682-83 (advocating for the no-modification rule to be adopted by all jurisdictions allowing
non-compete agreements).
177. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2012) (declaring any non-compete agreement
that contains an "unreasonable restraint" to be "illegal, void, and unenforceable even as to
any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint"); see
Lanmark Tech., Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006) (stating that
there is "no authority" in Virginia to blue pencil an overbroad covenant). Until this past
year, Georgia also followed the all-or-nothing approach. However, recent legislation gave
Georgia courts the power to modify unreasonable provisions in covenants not to compete.
Act of May 11, 2011, no. 99, 2011 Ga. Laws 399 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-54
(Supp. 2011)).
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1. Advantages
Proponents of the all-or-nothing approach cite several
theoretical and practical advantages to its use. First, they argue that
this approach is the most consistent with general contract
principles. 78 According to this view, parties to a contract agree to a
particular set of terms at the time of its execution, and this
"intersection of wills between contracting parties" comprises the
essence of the contract. 17 9 As an example, "[i]n reaching an
agreement that Party A would not compete with Party B within 200
miles of Party B's business, the parties did not simultaneously agree
to a geographic restriction of 199, 198, 197, or any other less mileage
limit."' 18 Under this view, any changes to contract terms, even the
striking out of unreasonable terms, would be contrary to freedom-ofcontract principles.' Indeed, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
regularly stated this view as the justification for its use of
the all-or18 2
nothing approach prior to the Welcome Wagon decision.
Second, proponents argue that the all-or-nothing approach
operates as a check on employer strong-arm tactics.183 If an employer
knows that courts will refuse to enforce any part of an unreasonable
covenant, the employer should be motivated to "take great
precautions to ensure that [the covenant] does not include
overreaching terms."'" By contrast, if an employer knows that courts
might be inclined to partially enforce a restrictive covenant that
contains unreasonable restrictions, an employer "can fashion truly
ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and
178. See generally Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of "Involuntary" Contracts: The
JudicialRewriting of UnreasonableCovenants Not to Compete, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
71, 74-76 (1999) (arguing that the traditional will theory of contracts is inconsistent with
the strict blue pencil doctrine and judicial modification); Pivateau, supra note 13
(recommending that all states recognizing non-compete agreements adopt the all-ornothing approach).
179. See Damren, supra note 178, at 74.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529, 535, 117 S.E.2d 431, 435
(1960) (noting that the court "must construe [the contract] as the parties made it"); Noe v.
McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242,245, 45 S.E.2d 121, 123 (1947).
183. See Khadye, supra note 169, at 240-41 (discussing "the unequal bargaining power
between the employer and employee"); Swift, supra note 12, at 246-47; Orelup & Drewry,
supranote 7, at 31-32.
184. Swift, supra note 12, at 246; see also Brian Kingsley Krumm, Covenants Not to
Compete: Time for Legislative and JudicialReform in Tennessee, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 447,
472 (2005) (stating that the all-or-nothing approach encourages specificity and rationality
in drafters); cf Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 173-74 (discussing assurances needed
to make sure employee mobility is encouraged).
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'
enforced when the facts of a particular case are not reasonable."185
The all-or-nothing approach, and its balance of risks and rewards,
may ensure that employers thoughtfully evaluate the breadth of a
proposed covenant at the time of contracting.
Third, the all-or-nothing approach arguably encourages
employee mobility, which is increasingly important in the modern
workplace. According to this view, restrictive covenants generally
have an "in terrorem effect" on employees and competitor businesses
because both sets of parties are uncertain whether covenants will be
enforced by courts.'8 6 Some claim that the strict blue pencil doctrine
and judicial modification approach increase the in terrorem effect,
because a court adopting either approach is more likely to enforce
portions of an unreasonable covenant against an employee. 187 The
heightened uncertainty about the enforcement of restrictive
covenants thus discourages employees to seek out different
employment even when it might otherwise be beneficial."8 The all-ornothing approach arguably minimizes the in terrorem effect by
prohibiting the possible enforcement of covenants that have been
drafted too broadly.

2. Limitations
Notwithstanding the perceived advantages of the all-or-nothing
approach, critics have highlighted several disadvantages to the
approach. First, it is not clear that the all-or-nothing approach is in
fact consistent with freedom-of-contract principles. When a court
declines to enforce a covenant not to compete, it does so despite the
fact that such a covenant is often but one component of a much larger
employment contract, and presumably a covenant for which the

185. Blake, supranote 8, at 683.
186. Id. at 682; Pivateau, supra note 13, at 689-91.
187. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and Contract
Formation:What Employment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.

REV. 155, 160 (2003) (stating concerns that "blue pencil" jurisdictions create "in terrorem
effects . . on employees whose cases settle, but also on those who are discouraged from
leaving their employer altogether").
188. Pivateau, supra note 13, at 690-92; see also Khadye, supra note 169, at 240-41
(discussing the negative impact of non-compete agreements on employee mobility,
particularly in jurisdictions that allow for modification of covenants). In fact, several
scholars have argued that non-compete agreements have such a negative impact on
employee mobility that they stifle business growth and development, and thus jurisdictions
should void all such restrictions on public policy grounds. See Bishara, supra note 22, at

311 (discussing common arguments against non-compete agreements).
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employer compensated the employee."8 9 Viewed in this light, the allor-nothing approach actually creates a windfall for employees, for
they are not required to give back any consideration they received in
exchange for agreeing to the covenant. 190
Second, the all-or-nothing approach presupposes that employers,
if given an opportunity, will choose to draft restrictive covenants as
broadly as courts will permit. While that premise might hold true for
covenants with lower-level employees, who presumably have
relatively little bargaining power, that premise does not necessarily
hold true for covenants with higher-level employees, and it is these
higher-level employees who are often the subject of modern noncompete disputes.'91 Furthermore, it may be difficult for an employer
to know, at the time that an employee signs a non-compete
agreement, precisely what information and responsibilities will be
entrusted to the employee throughout the course of employment. 92
For that reason, an employer may have, in good faith, included a list
of prohibited activities and territories in a covenant not to compete
that did not ultimately reflect the employee's actual responsibilities.193
Third, the all-or-nothing approach may not actually operate as an
effective deterrent for employer overreaching. By its nature, the
reasonableness standard is a "fuzzy" one, not capable of hard-andfast guidelines. 194 As discussed in Part I, North Carolina courts have
struggled to identify any concrete principles that could assist in
deciding future cases or guide employers who want to ensure that
they draft reasonable covenants. A prime example of this struggle is
in evaluating time restrictions; other than suggesting that restrictions
over five years will be unreasonable, North Carolina courts have not

189. Damren, supra note 178, at 82 ("At the time the enforceability of the restrictive
covenants contained in the parties' agreement can first be tested and subjected to judicial
review, the employer has generally provided the employee with the full value of the
consideration that the employee bargained for in reaching their overall agreement.
Nevertheless, at the same point in time, the employee has only provided the employer
with part of the consideration to their overall agreement.").
190. See id. at 73 ("For example, when the court reduced the geographic boundary of a
covenant not to compete from 200 miles to 125 miles, the court did not also reduce the
employee's salary by any percentage amount, much less by 37.5%.").
191. See Blake, supra note 8, at 647-48 (noting the problem of unequal bargaining
power, even as early as the 1960s).
192. Swift, supra note 12, at 253 ("It is unrealistic in many employment situations to
expect the employer to be able to accurately predict the scope of an employee's duties in
five, ten, or more years down the road.").
193. See id.
194. Id.
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been able to articulate any concrete principles to follow.195 Because of
the lack of clear guidance, employers are arguably put at a distinct
disadvantage in drafting covenants, for they risk having the entire
covenant held unenforceable on account of any overbroad term.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the all-or-nothing
approach arguably produces even further uncertainty in the law, as
courts struggle with the harsh effects of its application. The problem
arises from the fact that courts, when faced with deciding whether to
enforce a restrictive covenant, are tempted to "ignor[e] the
reasonableness of the terms of the covenant as an abstract matter and
concentrat[e] on the reasonableness of what the former employee is
'
While it is
actually doing in breach of his agreement."196
understandable for a court to be inclined to consider the equity of
enforcing a restrictive covenant, its decision ultimately should rest on
whether the covenant, as written, is reasonable. This tension would be
most pronounced in jurisdictions that have adopted the all-or-nothing
approach, for there is no way for a court to enforce any part of a
covenant against an employee unless it finds the entire covenant to be
reasonable.
The Strict Blue Pencil Doctrine:A FormalisticCompromise
Although most jurisdictions initially adopted an all-or-nothing
approach, many rejected it in favor of the strict blue pencil
doctrine.1 97 Courts applying this doctrine may enforce a covenant not
to compete if it is possible to strike out unreasonable terms-without
any additions or modifications-to produce a reasonable covenant.198
Even jurisdictions adopting this doctrine have applied it in one of two
ways: some, like North Carolina, require that the offending terms be
"distinctly separable" from the remainder of the covenant; 199 others
"review an agreement more generally to see if certain prohibitions
B.

195. Cf Pivateau, supra note 13, at 680 (noting courts' difficulties in articulating
permissible time restrictions).
196. Blake, supra note 8, at 674.
197. See Swift, supra note 12, at 247; see also Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255
N.C. 244, 248, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961) (noting that most jurisdictions had begun
applying the doctrine at that time).
198. Swift, supra note 12, at 247-49 (describing the general approach); see also
Pivateau, supra note 13, at 683-87 (providing examples of different states that have
adopted the strict blue pencil doctrine).
199. See Swift, supra note 12, at 248; Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App.
307, 317, 350 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1994) (limiting application of strict blue pencil doctrine in
North Carolina to covenants that contain a "distinctly separable part" that can be excised
"in order to render the provision reasonable").
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may be removed," without requiring that the offending terms be
separable. 2 °°
1. Advantages
The strict blue pencil doctrine can be viewed as a practical
compromise between the all-or-nothing approach and the judicial
modification approach. On the one hand, it softens the sometimes
harsh results of the all-or-nothing approach because it enables the
enforcement of some covenant restrictions against an employee
despite the existence of overbroad terms.2 1' This flexibility in
enforcement theoretically has two positive practical effects: first, it
ensures that some employees will be held to reasonable restrictions to
which they agreed, and second, it lessens the pressure on courts to
uphold entire covenants in order to enforce particular restrictions
against employees.
At the same time, the limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine
ensure that the language enforced by a court is at least part of the
actual language agreed to by the parties.2' This feature of the
doctrine should appeal to those who view judicial modification as an
"involuntary contract," the terms of which neither side agreed to nor
bargained for. 0 3 Jurisdictions that further limit the doctrine's
application to separable provisions have an even stronger argument
in this regard, because the contract was written to permit this type of
enforcement.204
The covenant at issue in Welcome Wagon is one that aptly
demonstrates how the strict blue pencil doctrine can be applied to
enforce reasonable provisions of a restrictive covenant. Whereas the
covenant contained one five-year time restriction, the territorial
restriction was divided into four separately numbered subsections.2 5
Because of the way in which the covenant was drafted, the Welcome

200. Swift, supra note 12, at 223.
201. See Krumm, supra note 184, at 472 (discussing the use of the strict blue pencil
doctrine to enforce portions of unreasonable restrictive covenants).
202. Id.; Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1984)
(identifying advantages of the strict blue pencil doctrine).
203. See Damren, supra note 178, at 71; see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at
119 ("IClourts should not rewrite a contract and impose it on an employee who did not
voluntarily agree to it.").
204. See Blake, supra note 8, at 690-91.
205. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 246, 120 S.E.2d 739, 740
(1961). For more discussion of Welcome Wagon, see supra Part II.
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Wagon court deemed the covenant separable and enforced the local
2 6
territorial restriction against the employee. 1
2. Limitations
The primary criticism of the strict blue pencil doctrine is that it is
"too mechanical, placing undue emphasis on whether covenants are
separate and thereby glorifying form over substance. ' 2 7 Justice
Bobbitt, in his dissent in Welcome Wagon, warned that because of the
adoption of the strict blue pencil doctrine, the enforceability of a
covenant could turn on whether the covenant had separated divisions
of territory using the conjunction "or" instead of "and"-an
insignificant word choice that should have no bearing on a covenant's
enforcement. 20 8 As noted in Part II, North Carolina courts have, at
times, made such fine distinctions in deciding whether to apply the
doctrine; 0 9 yet, in other instances they have chosen to apply the
doctrine to covenants that did not appear to be separable.21 ° Similarly,
the doctrine's requirement that the remaining covenant retain
enforceable temporal, territorial, and scope-of-employment
restrictions has further limited the practical application of the
doctrine to covenants that are drafted in a particular manner.2
Simultaneously, the strict blue pencil doctrine provides a
blueprint for employers to draft covenants containing extremely
broad restrictions, provided that employers do so with the formalistic
requirements of the doctrine in mind. Justice Bobbitt pointed out this
issue in his Welcome Wagon dissent:
[I]f the "blue pencil" rule is adopted, there would seem no
reason why the court should not uphold a provision it deems
reasonable in respect of time if worded in the alternative, for
example, a provision restricting competition (1) for one year, or
(2) for two years, or (3) for three years, or (4) for four years,
and so on ad infinitum.212

206. See Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 248-50, 120 S.E.2d at 742-43; see also supra Part
II.

207. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 130.
208. See, e.g., Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 747 (Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting).
209. See supra notes 127-45.
210. See supra notes 146-51.
211. Swift, supra note 12, at 249; see, e.g., MJM Investigations, Inc. v. Sjostedt, No.
COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2010).
212. Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 747-48.
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Indeed, if an employer were to construct a covenant in this
manner, the court would effectively be given the power to "write" the
provision for the parties-a result that is antithetical to the principles
underlying the strict blue pencil doctrine.2"3 A 2009 article in the
American Bar Association journal suggested that employers could
"combat" the limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine by
"utiliz[ing] alternative restraints (e.g., establish geographic scopes by
radius, by city, and by county)., 214 Surely, this type of covenant
drafting was not what was contemplated by jurisdictions when they
adopted the strict blue pencil doctrine.
Finally, as recent North Carolina cases have demonstrated, the
types of covenants that are included in modern non-compete
agreements-such as those in Precision Walls, Okuma, and
VisionAIR-are often not separable because they do not contain
clearly defined territorial or scope-of-employment restrictions. 15
Thus, the perceived advantages of the strict blue pencil doctrine over
the all-or-nothing approach are limited to a relatively small number
of cases that do not represent the types of restrictions that most
concern North Carolina employers and employees.
C. JudicialModification: Reformation of UnreasonableCovenants
In recent years, the majority of states have adopted a different
and more flexible approach to enforcement of unreasonable
covenants not to compete: judicial modification. 216 Under this
approach, also known as the "liberal blue pencil doctrine," courts are
not only able to strike out unreasonable provisions from covenants,
but they are also able to rewrite covenants in a manner that is
reasonable and enforceable. 17

213. See id.
214. Orelup & Drewry, supra note 7, at 31.
215. See supra Part II.
216. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 130 ("[T]here has been a clear shift from the
blue pencil doctrine to reformation."); Swift, supra note 12, at 247 ("At least one court
noted that more recent decisions have rejected the all-or-nothing rule in favor of some
form of judicial modification."). In a fifty-state survey conducted by the law firm Beck
Reed Riden LLP, twenty-nine states were classified as reformation states, with ten
classified as blue pencil states, and five classified as "red pencil" or all-or-nothing states.
RUSSELL BECK, BECK REED RIDEN LLP, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETES: A STATE BY

STATE SURVEY (2012), http://www.beckreedriden.com/wp-content/uploads /2012/04/

Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-04-29-2012.pdf. Three states-New Mexico, Utah,
and Vermont-were called undecided and three states-California, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma-were classified as states where most restrictive covenants are void. Id.
217. Swift, supra note 12, at 247.
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1. Advantages
Proponents of the judicial modification approach have identified
several reasons for its adoption. First, it is touted as the most
equitable of the three approaches since it enables the court "to
fashion reasonable terms that are consistent with the general intent of
' Thus,
the parties to enter into a binding noncompete agreement."2 18
the enforceability of a covenant depends upon its substance, rather
than its form." 9
Second, judicial modification arguably better balances the
interests of employers and employees, ensuring that neither is unduly
benefiting from a court's decision regarding whether to enforce
covenant restrictions that were mutually agreed upon.220 Whereas the
other approaches restrict overreaching on the part of employers, the
judicial modification approach also ensures that employees may not
violate reasonable portions of restrictive covenants with impunity.2 21
Judge Steelman raised such a concern in his concurrence in MJM
Investigations: "[i]t is clear from the facts of this case that [the
employees] flagrantly violated the terms of the non-solicitation
agreement that they voluntarily executed. Then, when confronted
with their breach of contract, sought to have the courts relieve them
of their contractual obligations. 222 Under the judicial modification
approach, a court may be able to enforce such restrictions without
requiring that the entire covenant be reasonable.223
Third, judicial modification brings more certainty to an area of
law in which the results are, quite frankly, unpredictable.224 In part,
218. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 130; see also Gary P. Kohn, Comment, A
Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to
Employment Contracts and to Sale of Business Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635,
695 (1982) (explaining that the judicial modification approach addresses equitable
concerns that are raised by refusing to enforce overbroad covenants).
219. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 130.
220. Kohn, supra note 218, at 695.
221. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 176.
222. MJM Investigations, Inc., v. Sjostedt, No. COA09-596, 2010 WL 2814531, at *6
(N.C. Ct. App. July 20,2010) (Steelman, J., concurring).
223. See Damren, supra note 178, at 80 ("From a practical perspective, permitting a
court to 'rewrite' the restrictive terms of the parties' ten-year-old agreement in a fashion
that renders those terms reasonable in the current competitive environment . . . much
more fairly balances the interests of the employee, employer, and the public."); Kohn,
supra note 218, at 697 (arguing that modification enables courts "to uphold otherwise
reasonable covenants that merely violate technical requirements . . . to prevent the
employee from taking advantage of the situation").
224. See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
JudicialEnforcement of Employee CovenantsNot to Compete-A Proposalfor Reform, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 544 (1984) (noting the inconsistency in application of modern analysis
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this lack of predictability is due to the fact that a court's
determination of reasonableness is based on the "facts and
circumstances of the particular case. ' 22 The highly fact-specific
nature of the determination makes it less likely that a different
employer can rely on the outcome of a decided case in drafting future
restrictive covenants. This uncertainty is exacerbated in jurisdictions
that have adopted the all-or-nothing approach or the strict blue pencil
doctrine, for in deeming a covenant to be unreasonable, it is unlikely
that a court will explain how such a covenant could be made
reasonable. By contrast, courts using the judicial modification
approach will provide such guidance in the course of revising
covenant terms. 226 Employers, in turn, should be able to use this
guidance to draft covenants in the future that will be enforceable as
written.
Fourth, by increasing the degree to which employers can rely on
the partial enforcement of covenant restrictions, employers will be
encouraged to invest more money in human capital, including raising
employee wages and increasing opportunities for employee training
and knowledge acquisition. 227 This argument is an important one
because it lessens the concern that non-compete agreements will
unduly restrict employees from accepting higher paying positions with
competitors.228
2. Limitations
Although the judicial modification approach has been adopted in
most jurisdictions, it has not gained universal acceptance. A common
criticism of the approach is that it "does not discourage employers
from broadly drafting their noncompete agreements."22 9 Some critics
go further in arguing that judicial modification actually encourages
of covenants not to compete); M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding
the Cost of Unpredictability,10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137,147-48 (2003).
225. Clyde Rudd & Assocs. v. Taylor, 29 N.C. App. 679, 684, 225 S.E.2d 602, 605
(1976).
226. See, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ohio 1991)
(applying the judicial modification approach to rewrite unreasonable covenant). The
Rogers court described its task in the following manner: "Although we conclude that the
covenants not to compete create an excessive hardship on appellees, our inquiry,
nevertheless, cannot end here. We must also determine whether some restrictions
prohibiting appellees from competing are necessary to protect Runfola's business
interests." Id. The court continued by identifying the interests to be protected and
modifying the covenant accordingly. See id.
227. Bishara, supra note 22, at 305.
228. See id. at 301.
229. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 176.
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employers to draft overbroad covenants because they are not
penalized for their conduct.2 3 °
A related criticism of the judicial modification approach is that it
has a disproportionate in terrorem effect on employees.2 3 ' According
to one court:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are
thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees
who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors
who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or
who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their
counterparts. Thus, the mobility of untold numbers of
employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions whose
severity no court would sanction.232
Because the judicial modification approach does not deter employers
from including increasingly broad restrictions in covenants,
employees will forego seeking and accepting positions that could be
within an overbroad, yet ultimately unenforceable, covenant.
Critics of the judicial modification approach also claim that the
approach creates uncertainty for employees, for they will not know
which covenant terms may be enforceable unless the covenant
becomes the subject of litigation.233 Justice Bobbitt echoed these
concerns in his Welcome Wagon dissent:
In testing the reasonableness of a covenant restricting
competition after termination of employment, the impact upon
the employee so restricted should receive due consideration.
The covenant, in its entirety, hangs over him. He cannot foresee
whether a court, at the end of protracted litigation, will enforce

230. See id. at 119 n.53 ("If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly
ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the
facts of a particular case are not unreasonable. This smacks of having one's employee's
cake, and eating it too." (quoting Blake, supra note 8, at 682-83)).
231. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
232. Pivateau, supra note 13, at 685 (quoting Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 80 (Ga. 1972)).
233. Id. at 689-93; see Ingram, supra note 176, at 78 (suggesting that broad restrictions
drafted by employers give employees the option of complying or bearing the cost of
litigation); See also Hanna Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley
Companies Should Know About Hiring Competitors' Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 981,
984 (1997) (discussing the costs of litigating company disputes over employees: "It takes
time, drains resources, and distracts employees and employers from what they do bestdeveloping new technology").
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the covenant as written or only within a segment of the territory
therein explicitly described.23
Even though Justice Bobbitt was discussing the court's adoption
of the strict blue pencil doctrine, his concern would likely have been
even greater had the supreme court adopted the judicial modification
approach, for under such an approach an employee would be even
less certain of the precise restrictions that would be enforced.235
D. North CarolinaCourts: Ditching the Blue Pencilin Favorof
JudicialModification
It has been over fifty years since the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected the all-or-nothing approach in favor of the strict
blue pencil doctrine. In the interim, North Carolina non-compete
jurisprudence has become even more difficult to reconcile, leaving
employers and employees alike with little guidance.236 To be sure, the
adoption of the strict blue pencil doctrine is not the sole cause of this
problem, but it is time for the judiciary to decide whether another
approach would better promote the reasons for allowing parties to
enter into covenants not to compete in connection with employment.
The categorical nature of the all-or-nothing approach and its
adherence to the entire language of the non-compete agreement have
theoretical appeal, but the primary reason put forth in favor of its
adoption is that it discourages employer misconduct and thereby
promotes employee mobility. For this reasoning to be persuasive,
however, two assumptions must be made: first, that the all-or-nothing
approach produces consistent outcomes; and second, that employers
clearly understand the types of covenant restrictions that will be
enforced. While these assumptions may be true in other jurisdictions,
such is not the case in North Carolina. Nor would adopting the all-ornothing approach lead to more consistent outcomes, as recent cases
that are among the most difficult to reconcile-VisionAIR, Medical
Staffing, Precision Walls, and Okuma-did not implicate the strict
blue pencil doctrine. Thus, the all-or-nothing approach unduly shifts
the burden of overbroad covenants onto employers, who cannot
predict whether courts will uphold certain restrictions and yet face
having an entire covenant invalidated if their prediction is incorrect.
234. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 256-57, 120 S.E.2d 739, 748
(1961) (Bobbitt, J., dissenting).
235. See Pivateau, supra note 13, at 694-97 (discussing the arguments against
modification).
236. See supra Part I.B-C.
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This uncertainty likewise makes it less likely that the in terrorem
effect of non-compete agreements would be substantially lower under
the all-or-nothing approach than one of the other approaches.
Through its adoption of the strict blue pencil doctrine, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has already acknowledged that in
some cases a court should be able to exercise its equitable powers to
alter a covenant.237 Both the strict blue pencil doctrine and judicial
modification approach are discretionary tools to be used by judges;23
however, the limitations of the strict blue pencil doctrine practically
prevent judges from exercising this discretion unless the form of the
contract makes the offending provision separable.239 These limitations
may also produce poorly reasoned decisions, as judges may be
inclined to uphold an overly broad covenant for the sake of equity.240
The judicial modification approach, like the strict blue pencil
doctrine, provides courts with a tool to partially enforce covenants
not to compete. Unlike the strict blue pencil doctrine, however, the
judicial modification approach does not depend on the form of the
covenant for its application. Thus, the primary advantage of the
judicial modification approach is that it gives courts a more precise
equitable tool to partially enforce a covenant, provided that the
restrictions are reasonable and consistent with the intent and
expectations of the parties.
The criticisms of the judicial modification approach should not
be ignored; rather, the Supreme Court of North Carolina should take
those concerns into account in developing standards for applying the
approach. Several jurisdictions that have adopted the judicial
modification approach have limited its application to cases in which
the employer has not acted in "bad faith, ' 24 1 and some of these
jurisdictions have placed the burden on the employer to show that it
acted in good faith in drafting the covenant.242 Although there is no
consensus regarding what evidence should be considered in making

237. See Welcome Wagon, 255 N.C. at 248, 120 S.E.2d at 742 (1961).
238. See Swift, supra note 12, at 251 ("Whether a jurisdiction uses the blue pencil
doctrine solely to eliminate an unreasonable term, or it allows a court to rewrite the
agreement, the doctrine is generally a discretionary tool.").
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. See supra Part II.C.
241. See, e.g., Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988) (refusing to
enforce covenant if circumstances indicate employer acted in bad faith); BDO Seidman v.
Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (N.Y. 1999) (same); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (same).
242. See, e.g., Data Mgmt., Inc., 757 P.2d at 64.
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such a determination,243 courts often consider procedural aspects,
such as "whether the agreement was discussed during negotiations
and whether the employer used unfair bargaining power to secure the
agreement, ' 24 as well as substantive aspects, such as "whether the
degree of unreasonableness renders [the covenant] unfair. '2 45 If
properly constructed, these types of limitations should deter
employers who would otherwise draft covenants as broadly as
possible, thereby reducing the in terrorem effect on employees and
ensuring occupational mobility.
Texas provides a different type of incentive to employers who
draft restrictive covenants with care. 246 Although Texas courts use the
judicial modification approach, an employer may only recover
monetary damages for breach when a covenant is enforceable as
written. 247 Furthermore, if an employee demonstrates that the
employer knew at the time of the covenant's execution that it was
overbroad, the employee may recover reasonable costs and attorney
fees from the employer.248 If the judicial modification approach were
to be adopted in North Carolina, similar incentives could be
implemented to ensure that its adoption did not have an
unintentional subversive impact on employer conduct.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina should reject the strict
blue pencil doctrine and instead follow the judicial modification
approach. At the same time, the supreme court should explicitly
identify the circumstances in which the approach may be applied,
limit its application to instances in which the employer can show that
it acted in good faith, and identify the types of conduct that will be
considered in making such a determination. That way, employers and
employees will both be on notice that covenants may be partially
enforced, provided that such restrictions are reasonable under the
circumstances, consistent with general contract principles, and
equitable to both parties.
243. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 5, at 131.
244. Id. at 176 (discussing Freiburger v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 111 P.3d 100 (2005)); see
also Estee Lauder Cosmetics v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (allowing
partial enforcement of a restrictive covenant provided "the employer demonstrates an
absence of overreaching, coercive use of dominant bargaining power, or other anticompetitive misconduct" (quoting BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1226)).
245. Orelup & Drewry, supra note 7, at 30, 35 (quoting Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. &
Health Care Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1149 (111. App. Ct. 1999)).
246. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51 (West 2011). See generally McDonald,
supra note 224 (describing the Texas system).
247. § 15.51(c).
248. See id.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TO BRING THE
ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN NORTH
CAROLINA INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Disputes over the enforceability of covenants not to compete
have largely been governed by state common law rather than state or
federal statutes.149 In some states, including North Carolina, courts
have struggled to consistently evaluate covenants in light of the
reasonableness framework and its consequences on enforcement.5 0 If
the Supreme Court of North Carolina were to adopt the judicial
modification approach, the outcomes of cases should be, on the
whole, more equitable, and the courts' reasoning should be more
consistent with the prevailing standards for evaluating the
reasonableness of covenants.2 51 Yet as explained in Part I, these
prevailing standards do not accurately reflect many modern business
operations. At the same time, North Carolina courts have been
reticent to articulate any concrete rules to judge the reasonableness of
covenants, instead engaging in a highly fact-specific analysis for each
case.252 Although the judicial modification approach should bring
more consistency to the jurisprudence, employers and employees
would benefit from more concrete guidance on the types of
restrictions that may be included in modern covenants not to
compete.
More recently, several state legislatures have enacted statutes
that govern some aspects of the enforcement of covenants not to
compete.253 These statutes serve several purposes. First, they clarify4
the state's public policy position toward covenants not to compete.1
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 cmt. a (1981) ("The common
law on restraint of trade has played a particularly important role with respect to promises
to refrain from competition. Parties who have challenged such promises have ordinarily
been content to assert their unenforceability under the common law and have not sought
relief under federal or state legislation. There is, therefore, an especially well-developed
").Only
and significant body of judicial decisions applying the general rule of reason ....
eighteen states have enacted a form of legislative guidance on non-compete agreements.
Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways To Leave Your Employer. Relative Enforcement of
Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implicationsfor Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 751, 759 (2011).
250. See Bishara, supra note 249, at 757-58 (stating that there is "no truly uniform
approach across jurisdictions" to determine whether a covenant should be enforced and
noting the general consideration of a "reasonableness test"); supra Part I.
251. See supra Part III.D.
252. See supra Part I.
253. See infra Part IV.B.1.
254. See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
573, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("California courts have consistently declared this provision
an expression of public policy to ensure that every citizen shall retain the right to pursue
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Second, they affirm-or occasionally alter-the common law rules
that have developed regarding how covenants are evaluated and
enforced. Third, if the statutes are drafted with care, they should
produce more uniformity in judicial decisions concerning covenants,
thus bringing more predictability to this area of the law.
This Part explores how legislative bodies may guide courts in
resolving disputes over non-compete agreements, and it suggests a
course of action for the North Carolina legislature. This Part first
explains how a legislative body may formally establish a state's
approach toward the enforcement of unreasonable covenants, and it
recommends that the North Carolina legislature enact a statute
authorizing judicial modification of unreasonable covenants.255 The
Part then explores statutory provisions enacted in other states that
have established or clarified the types of restrictions that will be
enforceable. While the North Carolina legislature would need to
decide whether to enact such statutes according to the current state of
the law or based on other public policy considerations, several
promising alternatives are identified and discussed.
A. Solidifying North Carolina'sStance on Covenants Not to Compete
There is no statutory provision in North Carolina that directly
addresses the extent to which covenants not to compete are
enforceable in the state; the only indirect reference to such
restrictions is in section 75-4 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina, which requires that all agreements "limiting the rights of
any person to do business anywhere in the State" comply with the
statute of frauds. 256 By contrast, legislative bodies in several other
states have enacted statutes clarifying their state's policy toward
covenants not to compete. A few states, such as California, have
enacted total or nearly total prohibitions on covenants not to
compete. 257 A discussion about the propriety of covenants not to
compete is beyond the scope of this Article; 258 rather, this Article
assumes that the North Carolina legislature favors the enforcement of
reasonable covenants not to compete, consistent with the current
any lawful employment and enterprise of their choice."); Steiner, supra note 23, at 27
(discussing how a recent statutory change in Idaho law reflected a change in the policy
toward non-compete agreements).
255. The approaches codified by statutes are the same ones used by courts and
discussed supraPart III.C-D.
256. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (2011).
257. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).
258. For legal scholarship examining the California's position on restrictive covenants,
see generally Bui-Eve, supra note 233.
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common law of North Carolina and the law in the vast majority of
states.259

Given the convoluted state of the common law in North
Carolina, however, it is time for the legislature to clarify its position
on covenants not to compete, both in terms of their enforceability and
the extent of their enforcement. As an example of the former, Florida60
revised its statutory provision regarding restraints on trade in 1996.2
The new provision provided for the "enforcement of contracts that
restrict or prohibit competition during or after the term of restrictive
covenants, so long as such contracts are reasonable in time, area, and
line of business."' 261 Even though the enactment of such a provision in
North Carolina would essentially codify the basic common law test, it
would also make it clear that reasonable covenants not to compete
are not highly disfavored in the law, as they once were, and covenants
should not be viewed by courts with suspicion.262
Even more important, however, is for the North Carolina
legislature to address the extent to which unreasonable covenants will
be enforced. As discussed in Part III, neither the all-or-nothing
approach nor the strict blue pencil doctrine has been successful in
North Carolina, and thus it is time for courts to adopt the judicial
modification approach. Although it is presumably within the
259. See supra Parts I-II (discussing North Carolina's common law approach to
covenants not to compete); see also Bishara, supra note 249, at 778 ("From the 2009
ranking data, forty-nine states (96%) and the District of Columbia allow some sort of
noncompete enforcement.").
260. Act of May 29, 1996, ch. 96-257, 1996 Fla. Laws 983 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.335 (West 2007)) (revising FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33).
261. Id. § 542.335(1); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a(1) (West 2011)
("An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which protects
an employer's reasonable competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an
employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after termination of
employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration, geographical
area, and the type of employment or line of business.").
262. See Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 160, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1944) ("Contracts
restraining employment are looked upon with disfavor in modern law."); Hartman v. W.H.
Odell & Assocs., 117 N.C. App. 307, 311, 450 S.E.2d 912, 916 (1994) ("A covenant in an
employment agreement providing that an employee will not compete with his former
employer is 'not viewed favorably in modern law.' " (quoting Safety Equip. Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. Williams, 22 N.C. App. 410, 414, 206 S.E.2d 745, 748-49 (1974))). Other states have
used language "strongly disfavoring" non-compete agreements. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Boohaker, Schillaci & Co., 767 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 2000) ("Alabama law strongly
");Coates
disfavors prohibitions that restrain one from exercising a lawful profession ....
v. Heat Wagons, Inc., 942 N.E.2d 905, 913 (Ind.2011) ("Indiana courts strongly disfavor as
restraints of trade covenants not to compete in employment contracts."); Wrigg v.
Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646, 648 (Mont. 2011) ("Montana
law strongly disfavors covenants not to compete.").
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discretion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to change its
approach, it has not done so. Thus, in conjunction with clarifying its
policy on covenants not to compete in the state, the North Carolina
legislature should also codify the use of the judicial modification
approach.
Several so-called "statutory reformation states" have enacted
laws that require or permit courts to modify overbroad covenants not
to compete so that they are reasonable and enforceable. Statutes in
Florida, Idaho, and Georgia help illuminate the ways in which such a
statute could operate in North Carolina.
Under Florida law, an employer has the burden of proving that a
covenant "is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate business
interest or interests justifying the restriction. 2 6 3 The burden then
shifts to the employee to show that the covenant "is overbroad,
overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect the
legitimate business interest or interests."'2 " However, when a
covenant is deemed unreasonable, the statute provides that "a court
shall modify the restraint and grant only the relief reasonably
'
necessary to protect such interest or interests."2 65
In enacting this statute, the Florida legislature codified judicial
modification as the state's remedy for overbroad covenants, an
approach previously recognized by Florida courts.266 Furthermore, by
requiring that a court use the judicial modification approach to
enforce otherwise unreasonable covenants that pertain to a legitimate
business interest, 267 the statute provides courts with guidelines for
presumptively reasonable and unreasonable restrictions.268

263. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1)(c) (West 2007).
264. Id.
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. See John A. Grant, Jr. & Thomas T. Steele, Restrictive Covenants: Florida Returns
to the Original "Unfair Competition" Approach for the 21st Century, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1996,
at 53, 55 ("Section 542.335(1)(c) makes plain that relief must be limited to that which is
'reasonably necessary' to protect the interest or interests established and that, if the
restraint is 'overbroad, overlong, or otherwise not reasonably necessary,' the court must

modify the restriction. This directive reaffirms prior Florida decisional law authorizing
application of the 'blue-pencil doctrine.' "). For an early Florida case recognizing the role
of judicial modification, see Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 859 (Fla. 1971) ("Where
no limitations are contained in the restrictions it is within the discretion of the trial court
to determine what limitations as to time and area would be reasonable under the
circumstances.").
267. § 542.335(1)(c) ("[A] court shall modify the restraint and grant only the relief
reasonably necessary to protect such interest or interests." (emphasis added)); see also
Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1264 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Health
Care Fin. Enters., Inc. v. Levy, 715 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
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Effective July 1, 2008, Idaho enacted legislation that permits
reasonable covenants not to compete between employers and "key
employees" to protect employers' legitimate business interests.2 69

Similar to the Florida statute, the "Idaho Noncompete Act"'27
requires courts "to limit or modify" an unreasonable provision within
a covenant so that it "reflect[s] the intent of the parties and render[s]
it reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and
[to] specifically enforce the ... covenant as limited or modified. ' 27 1 A
recent article discusses the impact of this legislation and, in particular,
its requirement that courts modify and enforce unreasonable
covenants:
Prior to enactment of the Act, noncompetes were strongly
disfavored by Idaho courts. Courts limited the enforceability of
noncompete agreements and, despite authority to do so, often
refused to modify overbroad noncompete agreements. The
Idaho Legislature altered Idaho policy regarding noncompetes
by
. . directing courts to limit or modify unreasonable
.

noncompete agreements and specifically enforce the
agreements as limited or modified. The cumulative effect of
these changes is a broader policy change in Idaho favoring
noncompetes.272
Georgia also recently adopted the judicial modification approach
by statute, 27 3 but the evolution of the statute and its import are

different than in Idaho or Florida. Georgia courts traditionally had
applied the all-or-nothing approach to unreasonable covenants. 7 4
"courts were required to modify unreasonable restrictions as to time and place rather than
refuse to enforce the agreement")).
268. § 542.335(1)(d) ("[A] court shall presume reasonable in time any restraint 6
months or less in duration and shall presume unreasonable in time any restraint more than
2 years in duration.").
269. Act of Mar. 28,2008, ch. 295, 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws 823 (codified at IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 44-2701 (Supp. 2011)).
270. Steiner, supra note 23, at 26 & n.10 (discussing the legislation referred to as "the
Idaho Noncompete Act").
271. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2703 (Supp. 2011).
272. Steiner, supra note 23, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
273. Act of May 11, 2011, 2011-2 Ga. Code. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 136 (2011) (codified
at GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-54 (Supp. 2011)).
274. See, e.g., Boone v. Corestaff Support Serv., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1369-70
(N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that because the contract at issue was formed before the passage
of the new non-compete act, restrictive covenants were against public policy and blue
penciling was not an available remedy); Murphree v. Yancey Bros., 716 S.E.2d 824, 826-27
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011) ("Restrictive covenants that are ancillary to employment contracts
'receive strict scrutiny and are not blue penciled[.]' This is because 'it is generally true in
the employer/employee relationship that the employee goes into a transaction such as this
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However, in enacting section 13-8-54 of the Georgia Code, the state
legislature provided that courts "may modify the restraint provision
and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interest
original intent of the contracting
or interests and to achieve 2the
75
possible.
extent
parties to the
At first glance, the differences between the mandatory
reformation provisions in the Florida and Idaho statutes and the
permissive reformation provision in the Georgia statute may seem
slight. But as explained in Part III, if employers believe that they may
securely rely on courts to later modify unreasonable covenants, they
have less incentive to draft reasonable covenants at the outset. In
turn, these overly broad covenants may negatively impact employees
who wish to change positions.276 For this reason, it is recommended
that the North Carolina legislature adopt permissive statutory
reformation using discretionary language similar to that adopted by
the Georgia legislature. Additionally, the statutory language could be
strengthened by explicitly stating that courts "have the discretion" to
reform and enforce covenants, provided that such covenants were
drafted "in good faith. 2 77
B.

EstablishingGuidelines for Assessing a Covenant's
Reasonableness

For employers and employees contemplating entering into a
covenant not to compete, the greatest uncertainty lies in whether a
court will deem the covenant to be reasonable. The common law
reasonableness analysis has no precise formula; rather, the outcome
depends on a particular court's evaluation of the facts and
circumstances of the case.27 8 However, at least five state legislative

at a great bargaining disadvantage' and 'does so in exchange for the opportunity to have
[a] job.' " (footnotes omitted)).
275. GA. CODE. ANN. § 13-8-54(b) (Supp. 2011) (emphasis added). The Michigan
legislature has similarly given courts in that state the discretion to modify unreasonable
provisions within covenants and enforce the covenants as modified, without mandating
such a procedure. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a(1) (West 2011).
276. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
277. Cf. Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 65 (Alaska 1988) (stressing the good
faith test inherent in section 45.02.302 of the Alaska Statutes, the statutory provision
allowing for reformation of "unconscionable" provisions of contracts). According to the
Alaska Supreme Court, the good faith test prevents a court from redrafting an overbroad
covenant willfully imposed by an employer. Id.
278. See Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 674, 9 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1940) ("The line of
demarkation [sic], therefore, between freedom to contract on the one hand and public
policy on the other must be left to the circumstances of the individual case. Just where this
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bodies have provided further guidance to courts for assessing the
reasonableness of a covenant's time, territory, and scope-ofemployment restrictions. 79 Such guidance usually takes the form of
rebuttable or conclusive presumptions for covenants that contain
certain types of restrictions.
1. Statutory Guidance Regarding Time
The most prevalent category of statutory guidance relates to the
permissible duration of the restriction. Two states, Oregon and South
Dakota, have enacted an absolute two-year limit on covenants not to
compete, measured from the date of termination of employment.2 0
Although this type of limitation provides much greater certainty to
the parties to a covenant, it gives employers no opportunity to
demonstrate that a longer time restriction would reasonably protect
their legitimate business interests.
Other states have created rebuttable presumptions for time
restrictions. In Florida, "a court shall presume reasonable in time any
restraint 6 months or less in duration and shall presume unreasonable
in time any restraint more than 2 years in duration. '2 81 For covenants
lasting less than six months or in excess of two years, their
enforceability is much more predictable under this provision than
without such guidance. At the same time, these presumptions may be
rebutted by demonstrating that the covenant is reasonable or
unreasonable given the nature of the employer's business or the
activities to be prohibited by the covenant. 282 On the other hand, this
type of provision provides no guidance as to whether a court will

line shall be in any given situation is to be determined by the rule of reason. Of necessity,
no arbitrary standard can be established in advance for the settlement of all cases.").
279. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Oregon, and South Dakota give such guidance. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 542.335(d)(1) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-57 (Supp. 2011); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 44-2704(1)-(2) (Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(2) (West
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004). Missouri contains similar guidance for nonsolicitation covenants. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.202 (West 2010).
280. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.295(2) (West 2007) ("The term of a noncompetition
agreement may not exceed two years from the date of the employee's termination. The
remainder of a term of a noncompetition agreement in excess of two years is voidable and
may not be enforced by a court of this state."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004)
("An employee may agree with an employer at the time of employment or at any time
during his employment not to engage directly or indirectly in the same business or
profession as that of his employer for any period not exceeding two years from the date of
termination of the agreement and not to solicit existing customers ... if the employer
continues to carry on a like business therein.").
281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(d)(1) (West 2007).
282. Id. § 542.335(d).
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likely enforce time restrictions that last between six months and two
years.
Georgia, like Florida, has enacted rebuttable presumptions
relating to time restrictions. 83 Yet unlike the provision in Florida,
which leaves a gap between presumptively reasonable and
presumptively unreasonable restrictions, the Georgia statute
establishes that restrictions spanning two or fewer years are
presumptively reasonable, while restrictions spanning more than two
years are presumptively unreasonable.2" So written, this type of
statute provides rebuttable presumptions for all time restrictions that
could be included within covenants, while not mandating that the
length of the restriction be dispositive.
North Carolina courts frequently state that a time restriction in
excess of five years is generally disfavored, but case law reveals that
most modern covenants being litigated are of much shorter
durations.285 Likewise, the information and knowledge to be
protected by modern non-compete agreements generally have much
shorter shelf lives,"8 which militates in favor of shorter time
restrictions such as the ones codified in other states. Ultimately, the
North Carolina legislature must determine the precise guideline to
enact; however, a statute like Georgia's balances the desire to provide
concrete guidance while still permitting the parties to a covenant to
demonstrate that their circumstances differ from those of the typical
business or employment relationship.
2. Statutory Guidance Regarding Territory and Scope
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is relatively less statutory
guidance on the types of territorial and scope-of-employment
restrictions that will be considered reasonable. An Idaho statute does
provide such guidance, however, creating a "rebuttable presumption
that an agreement or covenant is reasonable as to geographic area if it
is restricted to the geographic areas in which the

...

employee ...

283. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-57 (Supp. 2011).
284. Id. § 13-8-57(b).
285. See supra Part I.A.
286. See Krumm, supra note 184, at 476-77 ("[T]he rapid pace at which business
technology is evolving causes the information an employee acquires on the job to be
rendered obsolete in a shorter period of time. Consequently, traditional time restrictions
are no longer feasible in the context of high-tech business enterprises, (or even low-tech
companies that apply such techniques) because such a duration restraint would not only
unduly burden the employee but also restrict the free flow of human capital in the
market.").
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provided services or had a significant presence or influence. 2 87 Idaho
also has a similar rebuttable presumption regarding the scope of
employment, providing that "an agreement or covenant is reasonable
as to type of employment or line of business if it is limited to the type
of employment or line of business conducted by the ... employee...

while working for the employer. 288 Georgia has gone even further,
providing stock language for territorial and scope-of-employment
restrictions that will likely be considered reasonable.28 9
Although the statutes in Idaho and Georgia have promise, they
provide guidance in only one direction; that is, they indicate the types
of territorial and scope of employment restrictions that will likely be
deemed reasonable. On the other hand, the statutes do not state or
imply that more broadly drafted restrictions will likely be considered
unreasonable. If the North Carolina legislature chooses to enact these
types of provisions to bring more certainty to the law and
predictability to employers and employees entering into covenants,
the provisions should include rebuttable presumptions governing
both the reasonableness and unreasonableness of territorial and
scope-of-employment restrictions.
C. Formalizingthe Disparate Treatment of Higher-Level Employees

Within the last fifteen years, North Carolina courts have
increasingly considered the employee's role and level within the
employer's business in determining the reasonableness of a covenant
not to compete.29 Nevertheless, courts have thus far not articulated
the precise weight that an employee's position has on the
enforcement of a restrictive covenant. Several states have imposed
statutory limitations on the types of covenants that may be enforced
against an employee, based on the employee's job responsibilities and
role within the company.

287. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2704(3) (Supp. 2011).

288. Id. § 44-2704(4).
289. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53(c)(2) (Supp. 2011) ("Activities, products, or services
shall be considered sufficiently described if a reference to the activities, products, or
services is provided and qualified by the phrase 'of the type conducted, authorized,
offered, or provided within two years prior to termination' or similar language containing
the same or a lesser time period.... The phrase 'the territory where the employee is
working at the time of termination' or similar language shall be considered sufficient as a
description of geographic areas if the person or entity bound by the restraint can
reasonably determine the maximum reasonable scope of the restraint at the time of
termination.").
290. See supra Part I.C.
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In Idaho, an employer may only enter into a non-compete
agreement with a "key employee" or "key independent contractor,"
defined as a person who
by reason of the employer's investment of time, money, trust,
exposure to the public, or exposure to technologies, intellectual
property, business plans, business processes and methods of
operation, customers, vendors or other business relationships
during the course of employment, have gained a high level of
inside knowledge, influence, credibility, notoriety, fame,
reputation or public persona as a representative or
spokesperson of the employer, and as a result, have the ability
to harm29 or threaten an employer's legitimate business
interests. 1
To assist in determining whether an individual meets this
definition, the statute contains a rebuttable presumption that an
individual who receives a salary among the highest five percent in the
company is a key employee or independent contractor.2 2 Colorado
and Oregon have likewise limited the enforcement of non-compete
agreements to particular categories of employees, generally those
having executive, management, or administrative roles within
employers' businesses.2 93
North Carolina courts do not categorically restrict the
enforcement of covenants not to compete to particular types of
employees; however, the outcomes of recent decisions suggest that
courts will view a covenant's restrictions in the context of the
employee's responsibilities and access to confidential information.2 94
Given this trend, the North Carolina legislature may wish to create
clearer rules for courts to follow. Such rules could take the form of
those in Idaho, Colorado, and Oregon, which categorically prohibit
covenants not to compete except for particular types of employees.

291. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-2702 (Supp. 2011).
292. § 44-2704. The provision allows an individual to rebut the presumption by
"show[ing] that it has no ability to adversely affect the employer's legitimate business
interests." Id.
293. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(d) (2011) (limiting employer-employee
covenants not to compete to "[e]xecutive and management personnel and officers and
employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel");
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.020 (West 2007) (limiting non-compete agreements to
"individual[s] engaged in administrative, executive or professional work who: (a)
Perform[] predominantly intellectual, managerial or creative tasks; (b) Exercise[]
discretion and independent judgment; and (c) Earn[] a salary and [are] paid on a salary
basis").
294. See supra Parts I.C, II.C.
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Alternatively, the legislature could enact a provision that confirms the
current approach taken by courts in the state, under which the
position held by the employee affects how the time, territory, and
scope-of-employment restrictions are evaluated.
There is no precise blueprint that the North Carolina legislature
should follow in enacting statutes that govern covenants not to
compete. At the very least, however, the legislature should formally
announce the state's position regarding the enforceability of such
covenants and mandate that state courts reject the blue pencil
doctrine in favor of the judicial modification approach. Furthermore,
the legislature should consider enacting provisions that guide courtsas well as potential parties to covenants not to compete-on how the
reasonableness of covenants will be evaluated.
CONCLUSION

Non-compete jurisprudence in North Carolina is in urgent need
of reform. Recent cases make it clear that the traditional
reasonableness framework is incongruent with the modern
employment environment. Further, this disconnect is exacerbated by
the strict blue pencil doctrine, for its use as an equitable tool is limited
by its formalistic application. By adopting the judicial modification
approach, North Carolina courts would adopt the reform approach
used by the majority of United States jurisdictions and, more
importantly, have a flexible equitable tool. Yet judicial action should
only be the first step. The North Carolina legislature should also
announce the state's position on covenants not to compete, mandate
the use of the judicial modification approach, and provide other
statutory guidance to assist courts in evaluating the reasonableness of
covenants not to compete.

